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Scholars have long debated why certain common law breaches in
American jurisprudence receive criminal punishment (imprisonment)
while others only receive civil sanctions (monetary damages).
Scholars like Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi/A. Douglas
Melamed have used economic-based models and the notion of
efficiency to explain why tort breaches only receive civil sanctions
but crimes receive criminal punishment. Others, like John Coffee and
Paul Robinson, have questioned the explanatory power of these
models. Instead, they have focused on the moral difference between
torts and crimes. Simply put, a crime’s intentional nature makes it
morally worse than the carelessness typified by tortious activity.
Interestingly, scholars on both sides of the debate have largely
neglected to include contract breaches—a significant part of common
law—into their models. Like torts, these breaches also only receive
civil sanctions. What explains the similar treatment?
This Article makes an original contribution to the literature by
systematically introducing contract breaches into the broader
criminal/civil debate. It employs the aforementioned economic and
moral-based models in an effort to understand the treatment of
contract breaches. The economic model, and its focus on efficiency,
predictably explains why these breaches only receive civil sanctions.
The moral-based model stumbles here. Its focus on intent suggests
that a contract breach—as intentional conduct—also deserves moral
blame and thus criminal punishment. What is missing from this
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model is recognizing the unique nature of the underlying
responsibility in a contract breach, and specifically, the difference
between a “voluntary obligation” and a “non-voluntary obligation.”
This Article takes the innovative step of introducing this distinction
into the larger criminal/civil debate and using it to conclude that the
moral-based and economic approaches can be integrated into a
unified model.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................561
I. THE BASIC COMMON LAW BREACHES AND SAFEGUARDING
PROPERTY .................................................................................567
A. Contract Breaches, Torts, and Crimes ..............................567
B. Equalizing Harms: The Safeguarding of Property ............570
C. The Public/Private Distinction ..........................................573
II. THE ECONOMIC MODEL AND THE EFFICIENCY-DETERRENCE
RELATIONSHIP ...........................................................................575
A. Efficiency/Deterrence: Crime vs. Tort Breach ..................582
B. The Efficiency/Deterrence of a Contract Breach...............587
C. The Efficiency/Deterrence of Fraudulent Inducement ......590
III. THE MORAL-BASED MODEL AND THE ROLE OF CULPABILITY ....592
A. Culpability: Crime vs. Tort Breach ...................................598
B. Integrating the Economic and Moral-Based Models .........602
IV. CONTRACT BREACHES AND THE ROLE OF CULPABILITY ............604
A. The Culpability of a Contract Breach ................................605
B. The Culpability of Fraudulent Inducement ........................607
C. Contract Breaches and the Moral-Based/Economic
Models ................................................................................609
V. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF CONTRACTS: VOLUNTARY
OBLIGATIONS VS. NON-VOLUNTARY OBLIGATIONS ..................610
A. The Elements of a Contract Breach and Criminal/Tort
Breach ................................................................................611
B. The Moral-Based Model: A Redux ....................................613
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................617

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793421

2012]

CONTRACT BREACHES

561

INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long debated why certain common law breaches in
American jurisprudence receive criminal punishment (imprisonment)
while others only receive civil sanctions (monetary damages).1 These
scholars, however, have focused only on torts and crimes and have
largely left out contract breaches—a significant part of common law
doctrine. Like its tort counterpart, this breach also only receives civil
liability. What explains the similar treatment? This Article makes an
original contribution to the literature by systematically introducing
contract breaches into this debate on the criminal/civil divide.
It is important to say something about harms. Any meaningful
comparison of these three common law breaches requires equalizing
the harms involved. Otherwise, the analogy will break down. For
example, murdering someone is obviously worse than negligently
destroying property or failing to contractually deliver a good or
service. Explaining why only murder gets criminal punishment in this
case does not seem particularly difficult. The harms involved are
very different. Homicide is qualitatively worse than any damage to
property or loss of particular service. This assumption about harm is
important. This Article seeks to understand why, everything else
being equal, crimes alone receive criminal punishment, while both
tort and contract breaches only trigger monetary sanctions.
This Article works out this ceteris paribus claim by appealing to
laws that safeguard property. A person may not steal your property (a
crime); she cannot treat your property negligently (a tort); and she
may not breach a contract by failing to compensate you for your
property (a contract breach). Take the following three cases:
1. Criminal sanctions can include fines, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1 (1985), as well as
restitution awarded to a victim. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Laura Lee, Edmund Lee, Monetary Recoveries
for State Crime Victims, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 819 (2010) (noting that some states allow restitution as
part of defendant’s sentence); Heidi M. Grogan, Characterizing Criminal Restitution Pursuant to the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act: Focus on the Third Circuit, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1079 (2005) (noting
that the Victim and Witness Protection Act permits federal judges to award criminal victims restitution
during sentencing); Randy Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime
Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 159-60 (1996) (noting that restitution is part of the punishment
imposed on a defendant). Civil sanctions include both compensatory and punitive damages. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347, 355 (1981).

562

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

Scenario (1): You are sitting in a coffee shop2 writing an essay on
your recently purchased laptop that costs $1,000. You leave to go to
the bathroom. In your absence, someone quickly steals your
computer3 (a crime).
Scenario (2): As you are typing your essay on your recently
purchased laptop that cost $1,000, someone negligently knocks it
over. You had taken reasonable care to place it squarely on the table
so it would not fall.4 It breaks completely and is now worth nothing
(tort breach).
Scenario (3): Wanting to sell your laptop, you contract with an
individual to sell it for $1,000. You give the computer to this person
and await delivery of the money at the coffee shop (per the contract
terms). To your dismay, this individual breaches the contract by
failing to bring the money. The person intentionally decided not to
honor the terms of the contract. At the time the contract was made,
this person fully intended to pay you $1,000 and said as much. The
individual simply changed her mind, even though she had the ability
to satisfy the terms of the contract (contract breach).5
In all three cases (collectively, the “Scenarios”), you lose the value
of the computer. That is, in all Scenarios, you suffer the same
monetary harm—a loss of $1,000.6 Nevertheless, only in Scenario
(1), the criminal act, could the perpetrator suffer possible
imprisonment at the discretion of the state. The perpetrators in
Scenarios (2) and (3) (the tort and contract breach, respectively)

2. These scenarios are set up in a coffee shop to make them as similar as possible.
3. This act of taking the computer would constitute larceny under common law as the perpetrator
permanently intended to deprive the victim of the computer. See, e.g., United States v. Maloney, 607
F.2d 222, 227 (9th Cir. 1979); Edmonds v. State 70 Ala. 8, 9 (1881) (citing Roscoe’s Cr. Ev. 622);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 note (consolidating larceny and other acquisitive crimes such as
embezzlement and false pretenses into the general category of theft) (1962); MODEL PENAL CODE §
223.2 (1962); 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.8 (2d ed. 2010) (same). For the purpose of this paper, the terms
“theft” and “larceny” are used interchangeably.
4. In other words, there is no issue of contributory negligence, an affirmative defense in tort cases.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2010).
5. The point here is that the breach was not accidental or unavoidable. The perpetrator simply
decided not to fulfill the terms of the contract. Perhaps, it was not in the person’s economic interests or
the person was too lazy to deliver the computer.
6. I assume that all computers have the same software and files, making sure their values are equal.
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would only be subject to monetary damages.7 They will not suffer
any imprisonment, even though these individuals have caused the
same harm to you as the criminal in Scenario (1). While this
distinction may be familiar to us, what explains it?
The major theories used to account for the varying treatment of
these breaches can be grouped roughly into two camps: the
economic-based and moral-based models.8 The economic model
relies on deterrence and efficiency to explain why torts receive
monetary damages but crimes receive criminal punishment.9
According to these scholars, society has a greater economic incentive
to deter criminal activity than tortious activity. The common phrase
used here is that “criminal law punishes while tort law prices.”10 The
moral-based camp has questioned the explanatory power of the
economic-based arguments. These scholars have argued, instead, that
the real distinction between crimes and torts lies in the moral
condemnation of the former but not the latter.11 Crimes generally
7. The perpetrator in Scenario (1) would also be subject to a civil suit for damages, probably for the
tort of conversion. See infra note 45.
8. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972); Henry Hart, The Aims
of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (criminal punishment, unlike civil
sanctions, represents “the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its
imposition”); Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1194–95 (1985) (economic model); L. Song Richardson, When Human Experimentation Is Criminal, 99
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89, 112–14 (2009) (finding that punishment, unlike civil liability,
expresses moral condemnation); Paul Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of
Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 201–02 (1996) (moral-based model). Admittedly, this somewhat
oversimplifies the scholarship. See generally Kenneth Simmons, The Hand Formula in the Draft
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV.
901, 909–10 (2001) (noting that the economic approach can be seen as a variation of a utilitarian or
consequentialists model, whereas as the moral-based approach can be seen as a version of a
deontological model). Other scholars have put forth more nuanced models. See generally Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 1 (1990); George Fletcher, A Transaction Theory of a Crime?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 921 (1985);
Alvin Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 905
(1985). Still, these two models represent the dominant themes in the literature. See Kenneth Simons, The
Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719 (2008)
(noting that the moral-based and economic models are the dominant approaches to explaining the
tort/crime distinction).
9. See Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 8; Posner, supra note 8.
10. See John Coffee, Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (1991); Robert Cooter, Prices
and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523–24 (1984).
11. See Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: I, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 756–60
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constitute purposeful conduct, making them morally worse than the
carelessness typified by tortious activity.12
Yet, scholars on both sides of the debate have neglected to apply
their theories to contract breaches. Perhaps, the thinking is that
because contract law involves voluntary behavior, it is readily
understandable why such breaches are not criminally punished and
nothing more needs to be said. At a conceptual level, it is not clear
how merely invoking voluntariness, without more, automatically
vitiates the need for criminal punishment. The victim of a contract
breach certainly has not consented to the deprivation of her property
without compensation. Additional explanation seems necessary,
particularly when economic or moral principles underlie the general
explanation for the criminal/civil divide.
To be clear, many scholars have used economics and moral
principles to analyze contract law. The notion of efficient breach has
generated significant discussion and holds that breaking a contract is
sometimes the economically preferable course of action.13 Perhaps,
less well known is the notion that a contract corresponds to a moral
obligation to uphold this promise.14 But all of these discussions—
whether economic or moral—center on the internal mechanics of
contract law (i.e. the analysis occurs intra-contract law). These
(1943); Robinson, supra note 8.
12. It is important to distinguish these two models from similar economic and moral- based
approaches that seek only to analyze and explain the internal mechanics of torts or crimes. For a
discussion on tort law, see generally Shawn Bayern, The Limits of Formal Economics in Tort Law, 75
BROOK. L. REV. 707 (2010); Heidi Hurd, The Deontological of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249 (1996);
Kenneth Simmons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing
Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901 (2001). For a discussion on criminal law,
see generally Marcelo Ferrante, Deterrence and Crime Results, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2007);
Hamish Stewart, Legality and Morality in H. L. A. Hart’s Theory of Criminal Law, 52 SMU L. REV. 201
(1999).
13. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.10 (7th ed. 2007); Robert L.
Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV.
273, 284–85 (1969); Gil Lahav, A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking and Its Application to
Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 163–64 (2000); Craig Warkol, Resolving the
Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient
Breach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1998) (efficient breaches benefit society as a whole).
14. See generally RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW
(1994); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Jody Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract
and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009); Daniel Markovitz, Making and Keeping Contracts, 92
VA. L. REV. 1325, 1328–29 (2006).
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scholars have not engaged in the broader discussion of why contract
breaches—like their tort counterparts—only receive civil liability.
Here, the scholarship has been restricted to the tort/crime
dichotomy.15
Thus, this Article makes an original contribution by applying the
aforementioned economic and moral-based theories to all three types
of breaches and explains why crimes alone receive criminal
punishment. The aim of the Article is not to recommend specific
normative changes. Perhaps, certain contract breaches should be
criminalized or some crimes not punished. This Article simply seeks
to understand what explains why we criminalize one but not the
others.
The economic model predictably explains why contract breaches
are treated like tort breaches. Contracts and torts share an underlying
efficiency that is in sharp contrast to crimes. The moral-based
position, however, is not as straightforward and cannot readily
account for the difference. A contract breach—as intentional-based
conduct—would also seem to elicit the same moral condemnation as
a crime and thus warrant criminal punishment.16 This is particularly
true if one includes contract breaches based on fraudulent
inducement as to an intended obligation; these instances of deception
or trickery also typically do not receive criminal punishment.17 What
is missing from the moral-based model is recognizing the unique
nature of the underlying responsibility in a contract breach. For this,
this Article distinguishes between a “non-voluntary obligation” and a
“voluntary obligation.”18 The former automatically applies to all
15. In one respect, this is not surprising. Torts and crimes share a common history. See David J.
Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 59, 59–60
(1996) (noting that in early common law, tort and crime both constituted a breach against the king’s
peace); see also Bruce Benson, The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law Experiment, 9
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 411 (1986); Nathan Isaac Combs, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58
VAND. L. REV. 241, 250 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Grant Lamond, What Is a Crime?, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD., 609 619–20 (2007)
(noting that the intentional nature of a contract breach suggests that, at least conceptually, it too could
receive criminal punishment).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164 (1981). Particularly egregious
instances of fraudulent inducement may receive punitive damages, a type of civil sanction.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). For a discussion of these breaches, see infra Part II.C.
18. Cf. Kraus, supra note 14. Kraus uses similar terminology, but his discussion focuses on the
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members of society, and thus, corresponds to tort and criminal legal
duties. On the other hand, a voluntary obligation must be
affirmatively undertaken, much like contractual responsibilities.
Recognizing this fundamental difference can save the moral-based
model. Understood in this way, the moral-based and economic-based
theories can actually be integrated into a unified model.
There are limitations to this analysis. It does not attempt to explain
the law’s varying treatment of all crimes versus all torts or contract
breaches. Instead, its focus is on the prototypical common law
breach.19 There are various indeterminacies within these bodies of
law that prevent any analysis from being true in all circumstances.
For instance, most jurisdictions today rely on a statutory criminal
framework in lieu of common law.20 This framework includes a host
of various violations, many of which are considered regulatory in
nature.21 This Article seeks to explain the treatment of those familiar
common law origin crimes against property or person that require
criminal intent.22
The Article is divided into five parts. Part I lays out the parameters
of each respective common law breach, as well as three related
scenarios involving the safeguarding of property. Part II focuses on
the economic model and how it handily explains the respective
sanctions all three common law breaches receive. Parts III and IV
analyze the moral-based approach and its shortcomings when it
comes to contract breaches. Finally, Part V explores the distinction
unique underlying moral nature of contractual responsibilities. See infra note 264.
19. This excludes many types of breaches, including strict liability crimes and intentional torts. See
infra Part I.A.
20. 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 2.1 (2d ed. 2010); Chad Flanders, The One-State Solution to Teaching
Criminal Law, or, Leaving the Common Law and the PPC Behind, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 167, 177
(2010).
21. This framework is most apparent with the distinction between malum in se and malum
prohibitum crimes. Malum in se crimes have a stigma of immorality and include acts like murder and
rape. Malum prohibitum crimes, on the other hand, are “criminal simply because [they are] prohibited
by statutes; [they are] not necessarily immoral in [their] own right.” Zoe Prebble & John Prebble, The
Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 693, 728 (2010).
22. See generally 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.6 (2d ed. 2010); Combs, supra note 15, at 253 (noting that
common law crimes required a “bad mind” and, at least with malum in se crimes, generally arose from
notions of natural law). In fact, one scholar notes that a malum prohibitum crime is “basically a noncriminal tort that is prosecuted by society at large.” Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8, at 36 n.189.
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between voluntary and non-voluntary obligations, in an effort to
rehabilitate the moral-based model and explain the treatment of
contract breaches.
I. THE BASIC COMMON LAW BREACHES AND SAFEGUARDING
PROPERTY
A. Contract Breaches, Torts, and Crimes
The basic common law doctrines of a contract breach, tort, and
crime are readily known. A contract constitutes a promise for which
the law gives a remedy in case of breach.23 Formation requires
mutual assent and consideration.24 Courts use an objective test. It
does not matter what the parties subjectively believed during the
contract’s formation, as long as they manifested the appropriate
intent.25 A breach occurs when one party does not perform under the
contract.26 This is a strict liability standard.27 If a party contravenes
the terms of the contract, the party is in breach, regardless of her
motivations or state of mind.28 While accidental breaches are
possible, it stands to reason that most breaches will be intentional.29
A breach entitles a person to bring suit for any money damages
resulting from the nonperformance of the contract; however, the state
does not seek non-monetary sanctions, such as imprisonment, for
such breaches.30 Usually, the damages consist of what the victim
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
24. Id. ch. 3.
25. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2
cmt. B (1981) (“The phrase ‘manifestation of intention’ adopts an external or objective standard for
interpreting conduct; it means the external expression of intention as distinguished from undisclosed
intention.”) (emphasis added); id. § 21; Lawrence M. Solan, Contract As Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 353, 354–55 (2007).
26. 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:1 (4th ed. 2010).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (1981).
28. Id.
29. In fact, the efficient breach hypothesis finds that a person should breach a contract if doing so
would be more economically desirable than performing under the contract. See Richard Brooks, The
Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); infra Part II.B.
30. See 23 WILLISTON, supra note 26, § 64:1.
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would have received from the contract or any loss she suffered as a
result of making the contract.31
Tort law also only allows for a private right of action.32 It is
commonly understood as a mechanism for individuals to seek redress
for wrongs against them.33 Typically, a tort breach requires a failure
to exercise a reasonable duty of a care where the conduct proximately
causes some identifiable harm34 to the victim.35 A defendant only
needs to be negligent in exercising this duty of care to be liable for
any resulting damage to the victim.36
Crimes stand apart from both torts and contracts. The state can
prosecute these acts and seek sanctions including imprisonment.37 A
crime typically requires a wrongful deed or act, an actus reus,
combined with a guilty state of mind, a mens rea.38 The defendant
does not need to be successful in completing the prohibited act. As
long the person intended to cause the harm and takes some
affirmative action, this person can be punished.39
The aforementioned types of torts and crimes are just the typical
cases. For instance, there are intentional torts and strict liability
crimes; but these are outliers and are not the focus of this Article.40
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (1981) (“The purpose[] of awarding
contract damages is to compensate the injured party. . . . For this reason, courts in contract cases do not
award damages to punish the party in breach or to serve as an example to others unless the conduct
constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.”); id. §§ 347, 356.
Relief may also consist of specific performance, depending on the terms of the contract. See id. § 357.
32. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 4 (2001) (the “purpose of tort liability” is
“primarily to vindicate the individual victim and the victim’s rights”).
33. See Combs, supra note 15, at 251.
34. Harm includes bodily harm, real property damage, or tangible personal property damage.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4 (2010).
35. See id. § 6.
36. Id.
37. The state can also pursue fines as applicable. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1 (1985).
38. See 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 5.1 (2d ed. 2010) (One may be criminally liable based on
purposefulness, recklessness, gross negligence, or even strict liability.); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02
(1985) (Most crimes, including statutory crimes, require some kind of ill motive or bad intention.); see
also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980).
39. 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 11.2 (2d ed. 2010).
40. For a discussion of intentional torts, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 5 (2010). There are
also certain strict liability torts, but these are extremely narrow in scope. See generally id. ch. 20. For a
discussion of strict liability crimes, see 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. §§ 5.1, 5.5 (2d ed. 2010). These crimes are
considered the exception, even amongst statutory crimes, to the general rule requiring an “evil-meaning
mind.” Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 n.4. It is not uncommon for scholars to put aside intentional torts and
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Moreover, the main goal is to understand why, everything else being
equal, crimes receive criminal punishment, but tort and contract
breaches only receive civil liability. This requires equalizing the
harms. An intentional tort, like defamation or infliction of emotional
distress, does not have a criminal equivalent.41 We do not normally
criminalize defamatory statements or words that merely hurt a
person’s feelings.42 So, it makes little sense to use this type of tort
because of the difficulty in finding a criminal act that causes the same
harm.
Strict liability crimes (e.g., statutory rape) would also not work
here. Again, these are outliers. They do not require intent and thus do
not originate from the common law.43 Moreover, using a strict
liability crime as the model criminal act would create the same issue
of trying to find an equivalent tort or contract breach that causes the
same harm.
Certain conduct also creates both tort and criminal liability.44 For
instance, the act of taking someone’s property would constitute theft,
a crime, and conversion, a tort breach.45 However, there is no point to
compare these two types of acts because the underlying conduct
could receive both civil and criminal sanctions. This Article’s focus
centers on conduct that causes the same kind of harm as a criminal
act, but nevertheless, does not receive criminal punishment. That is,
assuming equal harm, why do certain torts and contract breaches only
strict liability crimes when analyzing the distinctive treatment of torts and crimes. See, e.g., Claire
Finkelstein, The Irrelevance of the Intended to Prima Facie Culpability: Comment on Moore, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 335, 345–46 (1996); Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical
Criticisms of the Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 486–87 (2004).
41. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965), with 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. (2d ed. 2010).
42. Some jurisdictions do criminalize defamation by statute. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of Baxter
Springs, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293 (D. Kan. 2005) (Kansas statute); I.M.L. v. State, 61 P.3d 1038,
1040–41 (Utah 2002) (Utah Statute). This comparison still would not have been useful since the
underlying conduct would receive both criminal and civil sanctions.
43. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 n.4; 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. §§ 5.1, 5.5, 17.4 (2d ed. 2010).
44. See Nathan Isaac Combs, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 250 (2005).
45. See 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.3 (2d ed. 2010). The elements of conversion, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965), are similar to the elements of larceny, 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.2 (2d
ed. 2010). James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 29, 36 (1996); see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (finding that particular
conduct can constitute both a crime and tort); Thomas Colby, Clearing the Smoke From Phillip Morris
v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L. J. 392, 424 (2008).
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receive monetary damages while the equivalent crime, causing the
same harm, receives criminal punishment? This requires identifying a
harm that results equally from all three types of acts as well as
isolating those tort and contract breaches that only receive civil
sanctions.
B. Equalizing Harms: The Safeguarding of Property
As stated earlier, this Article looks to three primary ways in which
the law safeguards property: someone may not steal your property,
Scenario (1); she may not treat your property negligently, Scenario
(2); and she may not breach a contract by failing to compensate you
for your property, Scenario (3). In all three Scenarios, you lose the
value of the computer, but only in Scenario (1) could the perpetrator
suffer possible imprisonment at the discretion of the state.46
You could very well decide not to sue the perpetrator in Scenarios
(2) and (3) for the value of the computer. Or, maybe the perpetrator
in both Scenarios (2) and (3) decides to give you $1,000 the next day.
In either of these two situations, the individual, for all practical
purposes, would be “off the hook” and suffer no further sanctions.
On the other hand, even if the perpetrator in Scenario (1) gives you
$1,000 the next day or you choose not to sue, the state can still
prosecute the individual with the threat of imprisonment.47
In short, stealing is treated differently than both contractually
failing to deliver property and negligently destroying it. Only with
stealing does one suffer criminal punishment and the possible loss of
liberty. This difference may be familiar, but what explains it?
Someone not familiar with our legal system may think that all three
acts should receive criminal punishment because they caused the
same harm. Or perhaps, this person would say that all acts, including
the crime, should receive only monetary sanctions. As stated earlier,
scholars have attempted to explain why torts and crimes receive
46. You may also decide to sue the perpetrator in Scenario (1) for the value of the computer based
on the tort of conversion. See supra note 45.
47. As long as the perpetrator intended to deprive you of the computer when she took it, she can be
guilty of larceny, even if she later decides to compensate you for the loss. See People v. Pond, 284 P.2d
793, 799 (Cal. 1955); 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.5 (2d ed. 2010).
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different sanctions. They rely on the concepts of efficiency and
culpability. But what is missing from their analysis is explaining the
contract breach.
The obvious difference between Scenario (3) and the others is the
voluntary or consensual nature of entering into a contract. One might
argue that this fact alone explains why the contract breach only
receives civil sanctions. But the discussion cannot end there. For one
thing, consent is not the operative principle used to distinguish torts
and crimes. These models rely on economic and moral-based
principles to explain this distinction. As this Article will show,
voluntariness plays an integral role in explaining the treatment of
these breaches, but more explanation is necessary as to how this
concept informs the economic and moral-based models (see infra
Sections II and V).
For now, it is enough to say that if consent or voluntariness is
important, in what way does it, alone, explain the treatment of these
breaches? Take the perspective of the perpetrator. The fact that this
individual voluntarily entered into the contract does not suggest
impunity. In fact, the contract breacher had the option not to enter
into a contract and not take on the responsibility of paying money for
the computer. It is not clear why this person receives the benefit—
unlike the perpetrator in Scenario (1)—of being exempt from
criminal punishment. From the victim’s perspective, consent also
does not suggest impunity. You did not consent to having the
contract breached. Quite the contrary, you voluntarily entered into a
contract, expecting that the person would pay you the money for your
computer.
Simply invoking the terms “consent” or “voluntariness,” without
more analysis, becomes even less compelling when talking about a
contract breach based on a fraudulent inducement. In such a case, an
individual makes a false representation regarding an intended
obligation that induces the other party to enter into the contract.48 For
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 171 (1981) (discussing fraudulent inducement
where the promisor falsely expresses an intention to perform); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §
474 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
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example, take the permutation of Scenario (3) where the perpetrator,
at the time of making the contract, manifested an intent to pay you
the money but never really had any intention of following through on
the contractual obligation (e.g., she did not have the money). In short,
the person deceived you by making a fraudulent promise. This is
different from Scenario (3), as articulated above, where the
perpetrator fully intended to pay the money and manifested as much,
but later changed her mind.49 But, even in the case of fraudulent
inducement, the perpetrator will typically not be subject criminal
punishment for failing to pay the money owed.50 At most, if the
conduct were particularly egregious, the perpetrator may be subject
to punitive damages, a type of heightened civil liability.51
49. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48
(Tex. 1998) (distinguishing fraudulent inducement from a normal contract breach). It is important to
distinguish fraudulent inducement—a false representation of a future action or promise—from the crime
of taking property by false pretenses, which typically involve a false representation of a past or present
fact. See 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.7 (2d ed. 2010).
50. Some jurisdictions criminalize this type of fraudulent inducement. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 223.3; Ellen Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 752 (1999) (explaining the evolution of
federal fraud statues, such as mail fraud that criminalize false promises); Michael A. DiSabatino,
Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Crime of False Pretenses Cannot Be Predicated upon Present
Intention Not to Comply with Promise or Statement as to Future Act, 19 A.L.R. 4th 959 (1983)
(collecting cases showing that a growing number of jurisdictions criminalize this behavior, while others
have continued to treat this act as a civil violation). The fear in criminalizing this type of behavior is that
a jurisdiction “blur[s] the boundary between acceptable and criminal conduct.” John Diamond, Reviving
Lenity and Honest Belief at the Boundaries of Criminal Law, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 8 (2010);
Helen Gunnarsson, Fraudulent Misrepresentation Tort Limited to Business, 96 ILL. B.J. 282 (2008)
(noting that in Illinois, the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation has been traditionally limited to the
business setting, whereas the same type of fraudulent misrepresentation may constitute criminal conduct
in a non-business setting). In fact, under common law, this type of false promise was never considered
criminal, and even the Model Penal Code cautions that commercial transactions involving false
promises may not merit criminal punishment. 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.7 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that the
traditional view was that fraudulent promises were not criminalized but that the modern view has moved
in the direction of criminalizing these acts); Diamond, supra, at 7–8; Arthur Pearce, Theft by False
Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 967–68 (1953) (noting that American courts generally have not
criminalized the taking of property by false promises). These concerns do not exist with larceny as
articulated in Scenario (1), which is universally classified as a crime without reservation. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2; 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.2 (2d ed. 2010). Given this state of affairs, this
Article is useful in explaining why these two acts (larceny vs. fraudulent inducement) trigger such
different reactions and treatment. That said, this Article focuses on comparing why certain conduct that
causes the same harm as a crime would only receive civil sanctions. This limitation would exclude
fraudulent inducement if it receives criminal punishment. See infra Part II.C. So, this Article makes the
reasonable assumption that such conduct would not receive criminal punishment.
51. See, e.g., Great W. Sav. Bank v. George Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 580 (Alaska 1989);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
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While fraudulent inducement may be classified as a distinct
intentional tort,52 it is better understood as arising from a contractual
relationship.53 By definition, it requires voluntary action by both
parties—the person must make a false representation and the other
party must rely on it to her detriment.54 Most cases of fraudulent
inducement arise in contract-type settings, such as buying or selling
goods.55 This type of reliance is not present in the normal negligence
tort, such as Scenario (2). Here, the perpetrator simply failed to use
the appropriate duty of care.
Scenario (3’) will constitute the same set of facts and resulting
breach as Scenario (3) articulated above. Only this time, the
perpetrator falsely represented an intention to pay the money during
the formation of the contract. The victim has the option to bring a
civil suit against this person. But this remedy—applicable to
Scenarios (3) and (3’)—begs the same question. Why do both of
these types of common law breaches only receive civil liability?
Again, the harm—loss of the computer—remains the same as in the
criminal act. And just like the criminal, the perpetrators in Scenarios
(3) and (3’) intentionally deprived the victim of this property. With
fraudulent inducement, the perpetrator actually deceived you to give
her your computer without ever intending to pay the money.
C. The Public/Private Distinction
The simplest and probably most widely known explanation for the
criminal/civil divide—though the literature focuses only on torts and
52. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 47 (noting that fraudulent inducement is
distinct from the contract itself); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 525 (1977) (citing contract-type cases where fraudulent inducement may apply); Frank Cavico,
Fraudulent, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepresentation in the Employment Context: The Deceitful,
Careless, Thoughtless Employer, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 84 (1997) (recognizing the relationship
between tort and contract in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation and noting a “tort would arise out of
the contractual setting when an act of inducing or breaching the contractual agreement gives rise to a
separate and independent cause of action in tort”).
54. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 47 (describing elements of fraudulent
inducement); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (SECOND) chs. 3–4 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 525 (1977).
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 549 (1977).
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crimes—relies on the distinction between an injury to society and an
injury to the individual.56 This private/public distinction dates back to
at least Blackstone, who defines a tort as a “private wrong[] . . . of
the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as
individuals,” whereas a crime represents a “public wrong[] or . . . a
breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole
community . . . in it’s [sic] social aggregate capacity.”57 Scholars
have elaborated on this rudimentary distinction in an effort to
distinguish these two types of breaches and explain why only crimes
trigger criminal punishment.58 But, it is not clear how merely
appealing to the terms “private wrong” and “public wrong” does the
trick. More is required.59 Scholars have pointed out that public harms
are usually just private wrongs writ large.60 For example, a person’s
“private interest in the enforcement of a contract can also be
described as the collective, public interest in the security of
transactions.”61 Another scholar highlights the same problem by
arguing that society cares not just about preventing crimes; it also
cares about the fulfillment of contracts and the avoidance of traffic
accidents.62
Merely relying on the terms “public wrong” and “private wrong”
would be especially unpersuasive with the Scenarios articulated
above. Here, the harm is equal. In what way does Scenario (1) alone
involve a public wrong, thus warranting criminal punishment? In all
three Scenarios, the victim is wronged in the same way—the loss of
56. See generally 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.5 (2d ed. 2010).
57. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *5, Coffee, supra note 10, at 221.
58. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 60 (1974) (explaining the difference
by appealing to the notion that crimes create public fear in a way that torts do not). See generally
George Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. REV. 347 (1996) (focusing on notion of
dominance in explaining the difference between the public wrong of a criminal act and the private
wrong of a tort); Lamond, supra note 16, at 619–20 (using the public/private divide to suggest that what
distinguishes crimes from torts or contract breaches is the fact that only crimes are prosecuted by the
state).
59. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 221; 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 23–24, 328–30 (1959).
For a critique of this position, see Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justification for the
Tort/Crime Distinction, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 398, 402–03 (1980).
60. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 221; Pound, supra note 59, at 23–24, 328–30.
61. Coffee, supra note 10, at 221.
62. See id.; Hart, supra note 8, at 403.
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the value of the computer. It is not clear what makes the crime a
“public” offense and the tort and contract breach “private” offenses.
It will not do to simply say that only crimes are prosecuted by the
state, and thus, are public in nature. This is almost tautological. More
importantly, we still need an explanation as to why crimes receive
criminal punishment, whereas contract and tort breaches only receive
monetary damages. This Article focuses on two models used to
explain this criminal/civil divide—the economic and moral-based
models.63
II. THE ECONOMIC MODEL AND THE EFFICIENCY-DETERRENCE
RELATIONSHIP
The economic-based model for distinguishing between civil and
criminal liability has a long and developed history.64 This Article
focuses on three representative theories from Richard Posner, Guido
Calabresi/A. Douglas Melamed, and Steven Shavell.
Richard Posner provides one of the earlier and more famous
economic models.65 He essentially relies on the efficiency of
voluntary transactions over involuntary transactions to explain the
distinction between criminal punishment and civil or monetary
sanctions.66 His argument is based on two propositions: First, the
63. These theories are not the only ones. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8; Fletcher, supra note
8; Gruber, supra note 40; Klevorick, supra note 8.
64. Gary Becker probably provides one of the earliest comprehensive accounts of an economic
explanation for criminal punishment. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). His basic argument is that a breach is classified as a crime because it is
harder to catch criminals and not all criminals will be caught; so, the penalty imposed will have to
exceed actual damages (i.e., compensatory damages). Id. at 191–92. He argues that imprisonment is
used because not all individuals would be able to effectively compensate victims if the punishment were
monetary damages alone. Id. at 196. Other scholars have further developed this economic approach to
explaining the criminal/civil distinction. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8; Dau-Schmidt, supra
note 8; Klevorick, supra note 8; Posner, supra note 8; Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal
Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985).
65. Posner, supra note 8.
66. Posner also applies economic principles to explain the varying kinds of criminal punishment. Id.
at 1214–25. Why, for instance, does first-degree murder receive greater punishment than second-degree
murder or manslaughter? Posner’s explanation focuses on the probability of apprehension in each
respective case. Id. at 1222–23. Posner, in fact, provides intra-economic based analyses for all three
common law breaches, as well as other legal breaches. See generally POSNER, supra note 13.
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major function of criminal punishment is to prevent individuals
“from bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange”—
the marketplace—for the less efficient “forced exchange”
exemplified by the criminal act;67 second, tort law with its privately
enforced suits for monetary damages cannot effectively deter this
kind of bypassing.68
As to the first proposition, Posner argues that crimes generally
consist of inefficient, forced transfers intended to bypass the
voluntary market of exchange.69 He uses the example of coveting a
neighbor’s car.70 He contends that it is more efficient to negotiate
with the neighbor for the car than simply taking it.71 Stealing the car
cannot improve the allocation of resources.72 It cannot “move
resources from a less to a more valuable employment” because the
person taking the car is not willing to pay an agreed upon price.73
Moreover, if the perpetrator is allowed to take the car, she will
67. Posner, supra note 8, at 1195.
68. Id.
69. Posner, supra note 8, at 1196. Posner finds “acquisitive crimes—such as burglary, robbery, fraud
(false pretenses), embezzlement, extortion (by threat of violence), most kidnapping, some murder, some
assault and some rape” as clear examples of forced exchanges. Id. He recognizes that some crimes might
be considered “crimes of passion,” and so they do not have—at least ostensibly—anything to do with
bypassing the marketplace. Id. at 1198. He cites the example of killing someone because you hate them,
instead of because you want their money, or someone raping an individual because this person takes
pleasure in this activity. Id. at 1197–98. Posner contends that these perpetrators can be seen as bypassing
the “implicit market” of friendship, love, or consensual sex. Id. at 1197, 1199; see also GARY BECKER,
A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (discussing the economics of familial relationships). But see Gil
Lahav, A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking and Its Application to Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 163, 183–86 (discussing how some scholars consider certain instances of theft to
constitute efficient behavior).
70. Posner, supra note 8, at 1196.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1195. It is important to note that this notion of efficiency is not a simple utilitarian
calculation. See Markovitz, supra note 14, at 1332 n.13 (noting that the efficiency calculus works
differently than a straightforward utilitarian calculus); POSNER, supra note 13, § 1.2. Posner, in fact,
recognizes that stealing the car may “confer more utility (pleasure, satisfaction)” on the perpetrator than
the victim. Posner, supra note 8, at 1196 n.9. But, what matters is the economic value, which is
“measured by willingness to pay for what is not yours already, or willingness to accept payment for
what is yours.” Id.; see also Fred McChesney, Desperately Shunning Science, 71 B.U. L. REV. 281,
283–85 (1991) (explaining that under the economic model, crime has no net social usefulness and
eradication is desirable); Stephen Marks, Utility and Community, Musings on the Tort/Crime
Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 215, 215–16 (1996) (noting that some scholars include the benefit to the
criminal when assessing overall utility, while others do not take this benefit into account, and positing a
theory that accounts for both variations).
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expend resources to do so, which will increase the victim’s incentive
to expend resources to prevent the car from being taken.74 This
activity will increase net expenditures, with no social benefit.75 So,
stealing is inefficient, and it is in society’s interest to deter it.76
But, if the point of criminal law is to discourage this inefficient
behavior, Posner rightly asks why tort law is not enough of a
deterrent.77 His answer focuses on the ineffectiveness of pricing
crimes. He explains that while affluent members of society may be
kept in line with only monetary sanctions, non-affluent members of
society will not be sufficiently deterred.78 They typically will not
have the money to pay. This is particularly true for crimes of
violence such as murder and rape, which would be priced very
high.79 Criminal punishment, and specifically imprisonment, would
be the optimal type of sanction.80
Posner goes on to say that efficiency considerations militate
against imposing criminal sanctions for the typical tort.81 Posner
finds that if we criminalize torts, this would needlessly deter
economically valuable or efficient behavior.82 He uses the case of
carelessly injuring someone in an automobile accident.83 If the
penalty were imprisonment, people would drive too slowly or not
74. Posner, supra note 8, at 1196.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1196. Posner applies the same efficiency explanation to strict liability crimes, such as
statutory rape. Id. at 1221–22. He seems to claim that this conduct also represents an attempt to bypass
the voluntary market of exchange—in this case, voluntary sexual acts with adults. Id. at 1199. Strict
liability works here because society is not concerned about curtailing lawful activity on the border—
intercourse with young, but age appropriate, individuals. Id. at 1222. Posner’s model also strives to
explain inchoate crimes. Id. at 1217–20. Punishing criminal attempts not only deters the individual who
was unsuccessful from trying again, but also other individuals who may be considering bypassing the
voluntary market of exchange. Id. at 1217–18.
77. Id. at 1201.
78. Id. at 1204–05.
79. Id. at 1202 (recognizing that setting the monetary amount for such crimes would not be easy).
80. Posner concedes that this notion suggests “criminal law is designed primarily for the nonaffluent;
the affluent are kept in line, for the most part, by tort law.” Posner, supra note 8, at 1204–05. He finds
nothing problematic with this conclusion given that efficiency may dictate differing sanctions depending
on one’s wealth. Id. Posner also recognizes that criminal punishment may include fines, which can also
deter bypassing the market of voluntary transaction. Id. at 1206–07.
81. Id. at 1204–05.
82. Id. at 1206.
83. Id.
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all.84 Because driving is an economically valuable activity, we do not
want to discourage this conduct.85 Compensation, instead of criminal
punishment, represents the optimal sanction.86
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed present a different
economic-based model.87 They begin by articulating the concept of
an “entitlement,” which represents something of value, such as a
good or service.88 Society uses various rules to protect or otherwise
compensate for such entitlements.89 For Calabresi and Melamed, the
distinction between criminal sanctions and tort sanctions rests on the
distinction between property and liability rules.90 A property rule
protects an entitlement so that someone who wishes to acquire that
entitlement must buy it from the owner in a voluntary transaction.91
For example, if someone wants to buy another person’s car, the car
being the entitlement, she must negotiate with the buyer for the price
to be paid. This generally represents the most efficient mechanism
for the transfer of goods.92 It improves the allocation of resources
without making anyone worse off.93 Calabresi and Melamed contend
that criminal sanctions are used to deter individuals from
undermining an entitlement protected by such a property rule.94
84. Id.
85. This idea also generally explains the case of intentional torts where the underlying conduct is not
subject to any criminal sanctions. Like negligent behavior, this conduct would have some economic
value. Take the case of defamation. The underlying conduct—writing and talking about individuals—
may serve some economic value, so we would not want to criminalize cases of defamation. Individuals
would be afraid to speak their mind. The optimal deterrence would be monetary damages, which may
include punitive damages, depending on the nature of the tort violation. Posner, supra note 8, at 1204.
86. Id. Posner relies on the famous Hand Formula to determine what constitutes negligence or a
violation of the standard duty of care. Id.
87. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8.
88. Id. at 1090.
89. Naturally, society must initially determine to whom the entitlement belongs. It must seek to
decide how this entitlement will be protected or whether the individual can sell or trade that entitlement.
Id. at 1090, 1092.
90. Calabresi and Melamed also explain that certain entitlements are inalienable, e.g., your freedom
to be sold into slavery, meaning that they cannot be transferred or otherwise bargained away. Id. at
1092–93, 1112.
91. Id. at 1092.
92. Id. at 1093–94, 1110.
93. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1095. Calabresi and Melamed explicitly rely on
Pareto efficiency to describe this type of behavior. This type of transaction improves the condition of
one person without making another worse off. Id.
94. Id. at 1124–25.
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On the other hand, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule
when someone destroys or takes an entitlement and then must pay for
it after the fact based on some objectively determined value.95 Take
the case of an individual who negligently causes a car accident in
which a victim suffers physical harm. According to Calabresi and
Melamed, the most efficient way to deal with this tort would be to
assess monetary damages after the fact, i.e. employ a liability rule.96
Using a property rule instead would not be an efficient means to deal
with this kind of negligent injury. If victims were given a property
entitlement to being accidentally injured, we would have to require
all who engage in such activities that may cause injury, e.g., driving,
to negotiate before the accident.97 Under what terms would a person
negotiate the right not to negligently injure another? How much
would the right to accidentally “knock off an arm or a leg” cost?98
These kinds of pre-accident negotiations “would be . . . expensive
[and] often prohibitively so.”99 Therefore, it is more cost effective to
use a liability rule when it comes to these kinds of torts.100
The case of crimes is different. Take again the example of a person
stealing someone’s car. One might rightly ask, is it not more efficient
to simply charge the thief for the value of the car? In other words,
why not use a liability rule here similar to the case of a negligent
tort?101 Here the efficiency considerations militate against liability
rules and in favor of property rules. Calabresi and Melamed cite two
problems with using liability rules.102 First, there is the expense
95. Id. at 1092.
96. Id. at 1108–09.
97. Id. at 1094.
98. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1108.
99. Id. at 1108–09.
100. Calabresi and Melamed also argue that for certain intentional torts such as nuisance, a liability
rule—as opposed to a property rule—may be the more efficient rule for protecting the relevant
entitlement. In short, it may be harder to determine ex ante which party is the cheapest cost avoider, and
so imposing a rule that compensates after the fact—based on an objective valuation—provides the most
efficient way to deal with this kind of tort. Id. at 1119. Calabresi and Melamed also explain why
punitive damages may be used for intentional torts. They argue that this additional compensation—over
and above compensatory damages—represents the tortfeasor’s knowledge, contrasted with the case of
negligence, of the harm caused. Id. at 1126 n.71.
101. Id. at 1124.
102. Id. at 1125.
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involved in arriving at a collectively objective valuation of the car.103
More importantly, any such valuation would merely be an
approximate value determined after the fact, not something
negotiated by the owner and the perpetrator beforehand.104 So, there
is no guarantee that this kind of transfer—via liability rule—would
be an efficient transfer, i.e. improve the allocation of resources
without making someone worse off. The thief may value the car more
than the damages she must pay.105 This twofold argument is even
stronger with bodily integrity. For example, Calabresi and Melamed
explain that society cannot presume to collectively and objectively
value the cost of a rape to the victim compared to the benefit of the
rapist.106
This consequently explains the reason for criminal punishment.
Some “kicker,” e.g., imprisonment, must be added to prevent future
attempts at undermining property rules, which represent the most
efficient way of protecting the relevant entitlements.107
Steven Shavell presents an economic model that relies on five
factors to explain why crimes receive nonmonetary punishment, like
imprisonment, but torts only receive monetary sanctions.108 He
begins with the relatively uncontroversial assumption that
nonmonetary sanctions are overall more costly than monetary
sanctions.109 Based on the additional cost, the former should be
employed only where monetary sanctions cannot adequately deter the
conduct.110
He then turns to the five factors used to calculate the appropriate
level of deterrence.111 The first three factors generally bear on a
103. Id.
104. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1125.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1126. This explanation would apply to both completed and attempted criminal acts.
108. Shavell, supra note 64, at 1236–37.
109. Id. at 1235. Shavell contends that with monetary sanctions, the disutility the party must pay is
roughly balanced by the utility to the party who receives the payment. This balance nets little social
costs. However, with nonmonetary sanctions, the disutility to the punished party is not balanced in any
automatic way by some utility to another party. Moreover, nonmonetary sanctions require additional
social costs related to apprehending individuals and operating prisons. Id. at 1235–36.
110. Id. at 1236.
111. Id. at 1236–37.
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party’s ability to pay.112 They include the size of a party’s assets, the
probability that a party will escape sanctions, and the benefits a party
will enjoy from the act.113 The other two factors include “the
probability that an act will cause harm and the magnitude of the
harm.”114
Shavell explains that with most crimes, these five factors suggest
that monetary sanctions would be inadequate to deter the behavior.115
Similar to Posner, he finds that criminal sanctions work best with the
nonaffluent. As to the first factor, Shavell argues that because
“criminals as a class seem to have relatively little wealth,”116 it is
unlikely that monetary sanctions would sufficiently deter their
criminal behavior.117 Given the fact that many crimes are not always
punished and the defendant is not always caught, Shavell finds that
the second factor also militates in favor of nonmonetary sanctions.118
Specifically, a potential criminal—who probably does not have a
large number of his own assets—would gain a lot from his crime,
suggesting a monetary sanction would not adequately deter the
perpetrator. Because a criminal purposefully commits a crime, the
probability of success is high, or at least higher, than if she did not
intend the harm.119 For the same reason, Shavell suggests that the
magnitude of the harm caused would also generally be high.120 In
total, these five factors suggest that “something more than monetary
sanctions must be employed to achieve an adequate degree of
deterrence in the core area of crimes.”121
Shavell goes on to explain why these same five factors favor using
the cheaper method of monetary sanctions for the typical tort breach
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1236–37.
114. Shavell, supra note 64, at 1237.
115. Id. at 1237–38.
116. Shavell explains that “a primary motivation for some crimes, particularly theft, robbery, and
burglary, is presumably that the [criminals] have little money of their own.” Id. at 1238.
117. Shavell recognizes that wealthier individuals may also commit crimes, and his argument is based
on general tendencies. Id. at 1238 n.25.
118. Id. at 1238.
119. Id. at 1239.
120. He cites to murder, rape, and theft as examples of crimes that create a high amount of harm.
Shavell, supra note 64, at 1239.
121. Id.
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in which someone negligently causes harm.122 As to the first factor,
he argues that it is more likely that the assets of the average tortfeasor
are higher than the average criminal;123 so, monetary sanctions can
work as an effective deterrent.124 As to the second, a tortfeasor is less
likely to escape sanctions. Since she did not intend the harm, she is
less likely to avoid or to try to avoid identification.125 Third, the
benefits derived from a tort breach seem to be lower than a crime.
The tortfeasor did not intend to commit the crime, so the only benefit
gained would be the costs avoided in taking the appropriate safety
measures.126 Finally, while the quantity of harm may be large (e.g.,
negligently causing someone’s death by car accident), the likelihood
of occurrence is low.127 Again, this is because the person does not
plan to commit the tort, so the likelihood of success would be less
than if the person intended to cause the harm, as with the typical
crime.128
A. Efficiency/Deterrence: Crime vs. Tort Breach
Working from the above theories, the economic model can be
reduced to two interconnected principles: deterrence and efficiency.
The former is self-explanatory. Deterrence means preventing or
limiting certain kinds of behavior. Criminal punishment would be
more severe, or serve a greater deterrent role, than monetary
sanctions.129 Efficient behavior represents economically valuable
122. Id.
123. He specifically notes the large assets of corporate entities. Id.
124. Id. at 1240. Posner makes a similar point by arguing that “the affluent are kept in line, for the
most part, by tort law.” Posner, supra note 8, at 1205.
125. Shavell explains that if the tortfeasor tries “to avoid identification (as when a driver who strikes a
pedestrian leaves the scene of the accident), his act may be converted into a crime.” Shavell, supra note
64, at 1239.
126. Id. at 1239–40.
127. Id. at 1240.
128. Shavell similarly finds that intentional torts, like defamation, are best deterred by monetary
sanctions because the magnitude of the harm is much lower. Id.
129. Calabresi and Melamed say that criminal punishment, in lieu of monetary sanctions, serves as
the “kicker” to prevent future attempts at converting property rules. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8,
at 1126. The implication here is that criminal punishment is a greater deterrent. Posner takes a similar
position in acknowledging that criminal punishment, instead of monetary sanctions, would deter too
much if used for tortious behavior. See generally Posner, supra note 8. Posner also talks about the
stigma associated with criminal liability that is not present with tort damages. Id. at 1205. Again, the
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behavior. It is behavior that improves the allocation of resources
without making another person worse off.130
Under the economic model, nonmonetary sanctions, such as
imprisonment, are considered the optimal deterrence for crimes,
whereas monetary damages are optimal for tort breaches. These
respective sanctions suggest a different level of efficiency for torts
and crimes. The underlying activity in a tort breach is more efficient,
so it requires less deterrence. In contrast, the activity underlying a
crime is less efficient, so it requires greater deterrence.
Posner focuses on over-deterrence.131 For him, saddling tort
violations with nonmonetary sanctions would curtail valuable
economic activity. The calculus works the other way for crimes.
Posner finds that crimes do not improve the allocation of resources.
Therefore, it is important that this inefficient behavior is curtailed by
more severe sanctions, such as criminal punishment, especially
because most offenders will not be able to pay.
Calabresi/Melamed and Shavell do not explicitly discuss the
varying efficiencies of torts and crimes. Still, their respective
conclusions on optimal deterrence suggest that torts represent less
inefficient, or more efficient, behavior than crimes. Calabresi and
Melamed explain that merely pricing criminal behavior after the fact
would lead to greater inefficiency; more severe deterrence is
necessary.132 This makes sense, since a crime, according to Calabresi
and Melamed, constitutes an attempt to undermine a property rule or
an efficient market transaction. On the other hand, liability rules that
price the conduct after the fact can handle tort breaches without any
implication is that imprisonment is a more severe form of sanction than monetary damages, and thus,
serves as a greater deterrent. Shavell does not rely on deterrence but focuses instead on the greater costs
associated with imposing criminal punishment over civil sanctions. But, the implication here is that
criminal punishment is the more severe sanction. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 1235.
130. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1094. Calabresi and Melamed say, “[m]ost versions
of Pareto optimality are based on the premise that individuals know best what is best for them.” Id. at
1094 n.10. Posner seems to adopt a similar definition by focusing on a market transaction as the epitome
of an efficient transaction where an individual can negotiate an acceptable price for a particular good or
service. See Posner, supra note 8, at 1195. Shavell does not focus on efficiency and, instead, relies on
principles of utility in reaching his conclusions. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 1236–37. Still, one can
infer this economic principle from his arguments.
131. See generally Posner, supra note 8.
132. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1125–26.
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need for some additional “kicker” as in the criminal context. The
inference here is that criminal conduct involves less efficient or
economically valuable behavior than tortious conduct. Shavell
reasons that the tort breaches are less likely to result in harm, confer
less utility to the perpetrator, and are less likely to result in flight than
are crimes.133 These factors lead him to conclude that cheaper
monetary sanctions are sufficient for torts, and costly nonmonetary
sanctions must be used for crimes.134 The inference here is that
tortious behavior overall creates less disutility—thus, constitutes less
inefficient conduct—than criminal behavior.
This efficiency/deterrence relationship is best understood using
Scenarios (1) and (2). The underlying behavior in Scenario (2) is
economically good for society. We want to encourage individuals to
frequent coffee shops and buy coffee. This type of consumer activity
improves the allocation of resources—transfer of goods and money—
without making another worse off—both parties voluntarily
transacted. If Scenario (2) were punished by nonmonetary sanctions,
such as imprisonment, fewer individuals would engage in this
behavior. People would be afraid that they might negligently knock
over a computer when entering the shop. They may also take
additional precautions that would be considered inefficient (e.g., only
frequenting a coffee shop if no one inside has a computer).135
The same economic-based argument applies to other negligent tort
breaches. For instance, if we punish negligent automobile accidents
with imprisonment, this would curtail driving—an activity that also
has positive economic value. It generally facilitates the allocation of
resources without harming others. Imposing criminal punishment
may also prompt drivers to take additional inefficient precautions
133. Shavell, supra note 64, at 1239–40.
134. Id. at 1240. In all fairness, this Article’s discussion of efficiency and deterrence more closely
tracks Posner’s model than either Calabresi/Melamed’s or Shavell’s models. That said, to the extent
Calabresi and Shavell would not endorse this Article’s efficiency/deterrence analysis, their models
would still conclude that the optimal sanction for contract breaches would be monetary damages. For
Calabresi, contract formation stands as the quintessential property rule. Shavell’s focus on the size a
party’s assets and her ability to escape sanction would suggest that a contract breacher would be
sufficiently deterred by monetary sanctions.
135. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94
GEO. L.J. 1, 59 (2005) (punishing torts may encourage inefficient additional precautions).
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(e.g., driving very slowly). The net effect here is the increase of
inefficient activity.
Some kind of sanction is still needed. Without any, individuals
may be more likely to carelessly destroy computers or cause
automobile accidents—i.e., there would be an increase in
economically inefficient behavior.136 So, the optimal deterrence for
Scenario (2) would be monetary damages. This sanction will make
sure customers and drivers use the appropriate standard of care,
without chilling economically valuable behavior or encouraging
additional inefficient precautions.
Scenario (1) works differently. This act of stealing a computer is
inefficient and has no underlying economic value.137 It involuntarily
denies a person their property and cannot improve the allocation of
resources without making someone else worse off. This suggests a
need for greater deterrence than what is required for Scenario (2). If
we simply priced this type of criminal behavior, potential criminals—
who generally are not affluent—would not be discouraged from
taking computers knowing that they would simply have to
compensate the victim for the loss. Furthermore, putative victims
would spend greater resources trying to protect their computers. So,
the overall economic cost of pricing crimes would be high. More
severe deterrence is necessary. Thus, criminal punishment serves as
the optimal deterrence. This type of sanction discourages individuals
from stealing computers. Over-deterrence or chilling efficient
behavior is not a consideration—unlike with tort breaches—since this
activity has no economic value.
136. It is important to distinguish carelessly driving a car from driving a car. Only the latter would be
economically valuable or efficient.
137. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. This notion of “economic value” or “efficiency” is not
a simple utilitarian calculus, and thus, does not include the potentially beneficial consequences of a
particular breach. It may turn out, for instance, that by stealing the computer, the perpetrator in Scenario
(1) is able to create a computer program that revolutionizes the transfer of assets in a way that cuts costs
dramatically. One might argue that this crime creates more good than harm. This overall utilitarian
calculus is not relevant. The economic model is concerned with the nature of the breach itself and
whether it involves efficient behavior. This instance of stealing would still constitute inefficient
behavior, because the perpetrator took the computer without permission. To the extent a utilitarian
calculus should be used here, it would not matter because this project seeks to understand these
Scenarios with all else being equal. So, any positive result would equally apply to all Scenarios, and
thus, would not serve as a distinguishing factor.
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While the criminal must be in the coffee shop to steal the
computer, this is not essential to the criminal act in the same way as
negligently destroying the computer. The tortfeasor did not intend to
destroy the computer when the individual frequented the coffee shop.
So, it is hard to separate the tort—negligently destroying the
computer—from the economically valuable activity—frequenting the
coffee shop. Because the criminal knew what she was doing, she
could have been in the coffee shop and not taken the computer (i.e.
there is no problem with separating the crime from the economically
valuable activity). The economic model thus seeks to prevent all
instances of stealing a computer.
Diagram A captures the inverse relationship between optimal
deterrence and underlying efficiency.
S1
Deterrence

S2
Underlying Efficiency
Diagram A
The X-axis represents increasing underlying efficiency. As one
moves left to right, the efficiency or economic value of the activity
increases. The Y-axis represents increasing deterrence. Monetary
sanctions would be considered low deterrence, whereas nonmonetary
sanctions, such as imprisonment, would be considered high
deterrence. The term “S1” represents Scenario (1), or the crime, and
falls on the upper left. The term “S2” represents Scenario (2), or the
tort breach, and falls on the lower right.
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Deterrence and underlying efficiency are inversely related. The
lower the efficiency—and the lower the economic value of the
activity—the more deterrence is required. This makes sense from an
economic point of view, where the goal is to increase overall
efficiency. Because stealing the computer (S1) has low underlying
efficiency, a greater level of deterrence is desired. This would
decrease future crimes. Conversely, because negligently destroying
the computer (S2) has higher underlying efficiency, lower deterrence
is desired to ensure that the underlying activity is not completely
curtailed.
B. The Efficiency/Deterrence of a Contract Breach
Proponents of the economic model do not explicitly discuss
contract breaches when analyzing the criminal/civil divide.138
However, there is a wealth of scholarship on how economics explain
the making and keeping of contracts, most of which is not relevant
here.139 These scholars basically argue that contract making and a
regime to enforce these agreements promotes overall efficiency.140
This camp also finds that, sometimes, it is economically desirable to
breach a contract.141 The doctrine of “efficient breach” encourages a
person to breach a contract if she can compensate the other party and
be better off than if she did not fully perform.142 This analysis, by and
large, centers on the internal mechanics of contract law.143 This
138. Calabresi and Melamed make references to contracts as part of their discussion of property rules
but do not elaborate further on why these breaches receive civil sanctions. See Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 8, at 1106.
139. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541 (2003).
140. See Schwartz, supra note 139, at 556; POSNER, supra note 13, § 4.10; Robert L. Birmingham,
Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 291
(1970). ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1 (1979)
(noting that law and economics “may be able to tell us why people make contracts and how contract law
can facilitate the operation of markets”).
141. RICHARD POSNER, supra note 13, § 4.10.
142. See supra note 13; see also Kraus, supra note 14, at 1649 n.6 (citing scholars who support the
efficient breach principle).
143. There are certainly critiques of this economic analysis; they typically focus on the moral aspect
of keeping promises. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 14. See generally Frank Menetrez,
Consequentialism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L. REV. 859
(2000).
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Article’s focus, however, remains comparative.144 Still, this basic
principle of efficiency that also underlies the economic model can
explain why contract breaches are treated like tort breaches and only
receive civil sanctions.
Compare Scenarios (1) and (3). The underlying efficiencies of the
two breaches are quite different. The forced transaction of Scenario
(1) has no overall economic value, so society seeks to deter it
completely. On the other hand, the underlying conduct in Scenario
(3) was the formation of a contract, which has a high degree of
economic value. A number of things typically go into this kind of
transaction. Parties weigh their options and research potential buyers
or sellers. Because both parties negotiate the terms of the deal and
arrive at a mutually acceptable price, this transaction improves the
allocation of resources without making another worse off.
This free market transaction stands as the epitome of efficient
market behavior. Indeed, this kind of contract formation typifies
Posner’s idea of market transaction and Calabresi and Melamed’s
property rule. Posner defines “market” as the system of “voluntary,
compensated exchange.”145 Calabresi and Melamed’s concept of a
“property rule” entails the sale of an entitlement “at the price at
which [the seller] subjectively values the property.”146 These
definitions are just another way of describing the exchange of goods
or services via contract.
The high level of efficiency in contract formation requires low
deterrence when sanctioning a contract breach.147 The economic
model seeks to encourage this kind of behavior just like the
underlying conduct in a tort.148 Saddling contract breaches with
criminal sanctions would chill economically valuable behavior.149
144. Implicit in the notion of advocating for “efficient breaches” is that such breaches do not receive
criminal punishment. Otherwise, it would not make sense to call them efficient. However, this notion
accepts—without explaining why—such breaches, compared with their criminal counterparts, do not
receive criminal punishment.
145. See Posner, supra note 8, at 1195.
146. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1105.
147. See Fellmeth, supra note 135, at 58–59.
148. See id. at 54.
149. See id. at 55.
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Individuals would be discouraged from making contracts in fear that
any resulting breach would land them in jail.150 The number of
efficient market transactions would naturally decrease. This may
explain why contract breaches also generally do not receive punitive
damages.151 Like criminal punishment, this kind of heightened civil
sanction could deter individuals from engaging in contract formation.
This result is not economically desirable. Diagram B captures the
efficiency/deterrence relationship of contract breaches relative to the
other common law breaches.

S1
Deterrence

S3’
S3, S2
Underlying Efficiency
Diagram B
Diagram B incorporates Diagram A with the addition of the
contract breaches. Again, the X-axis represents increasing underlying
efficiency, and the Y-axis represents increasing deterrence—from
monetary sanctions on the low end to criminal punishment on the
high end. The term “S3” represents Scenario (3), or the contract
breach, and “S3’” represents Scenario (3’), or the case of fraudulent

150. Id.
151. See id. 58–59 (explaining that contract breaches generally do not receive punitive damages
because of the economic interest in not deterring efficient breaches); infra note 272. But see William S.
Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629 (1999) (arguing that courts
should impose punitive damages for all contract breaches, including efficient breaches).
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inducement. S3 and S2 fall in the same location.152 Both of these
breaches represent efficient underlying behavior that requires low
deterrence.
It may seem odd that these breaches (S2 and S3) receive the same
treatment even though one is intentional-based conduct. This concept
of intent certainly affects the analysis under the moral-based model
(see infra Part IV). But the economic model relies on efficiency as
the governing principle. Motives or intent do not directly play a
role.153 What matters is to what extent the underlying conduct is
considered efficient. Here, the underlying behavior in a contract
breach or tort is more efficient than the underlying behavior in a
crime, which explains why only crimes receive criminal punishment.
C. The Efficiency/Deterrence of Fraudulent Inducement
Diagram B places Scenario (3’) to the left of Scenario (3). The
former represents behavior that can be considered less efficient than a
regular contract breach (S3), but still more efficient than a crime
(S1). Breaches based on fraudulent inducement, like regular contract
breaches, generally receive compensatory damages. Only an
egregious instance of this type of fraud may trigger punitive
damages, something ordinary contract breaches do not receive.154
Punitive damages are defined as “damages, other than compensatory
damages or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him
from similar conduct in the future.”155 The economic model can

152. This Article does not make a conclusion as to which underlying activity, tort or contract, is more
efficient, which is beyond the scope of the Article. It is enough to say that both represent more efficient
behavior than their criminal counterpart.
153. Intent is relevant, but only to the extent it impacts the economic calculus. For Posner, the concept
of “intent” can, among other things, help identify the forced transfer that bypass the marketplace. See
Posner, supra note 8, at 1221. But, it is not intent qua intent that is doing the work; rather, it is the fact
that the individual is purposely bypassing the market, and thus, engaging in inefficient behavior.
Similarly, Shavell argues that intentional conduct is more likely to cause harm than unintentional
conduct. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 1239. Again, the focus is on how the intentional conduct impacts
the calculus, not the mere fact that the conduct was intentional.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
155. See id.
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explain this heightened civil sanction. Here too, the issue remains
deterrence and underlying efficiency.156
The underling activity in Scenarios (3) and (3’) is similar. Both
involved the voluntary formation of a contract, where the parties
came to a mutually acceptable price. In short, both actions represent
market transactions. Thus, it is fair to say that the underlying conduct
in Scenario (3’) involves somewhat efficient behavior.
However, there is a crucial difference between these two breaches.
The buyer in Scenario (3’) made a false promise regarding the
payment of $1,000. This dishonesty means that there was no true
meeting of the minds. The victim was relying on an inaccurate
representation when agreeing to sell the computer. At least with
Scenario (3), the perpetrator initially intended to deliver the money.
Therefore, it is hard to argue that Scenario (3’) represents a genuine
market negotiation. Because one party was not fully aware of the
defendant’s true intention, this transaction is less likely to allocate
resources without making the other party worse off. This key
difference explains why S3’ is not as efficient as S3 and falls to the
left of S3 in Diagram B.
Scenario (S3’) still represents conduct that remains much more
efficient than S1, where the perpetrator just took the computer.157 The
theft involved no negotiations whatsoever. There was no attempt at a
meeting of the minds. For the economic model, this type of action
would be the least efficient method for the transfer of goods and
services. The fraudulent inducement was still part of a negotiation
where the parties formed a contract. Even here, there remains some
indicia of a voluntary transaction (and thus some indicia of
efficiency), something that is completely absent in the criminal act.
156. The analysis would be different if fraudulent inducement were considered a crime. See supra
note 50. To explain why this type of action gets criminal punishment, the economic model would
conclude that this conduct does not entail efficient behavior of any kind. In this way, it is very similar to
the crime of larceny.
157. One might disagree with where S3’ is placed relative to S3 and S1. It could be argued that S3’ is
not as close in efficiency to S3, so it should be placed more in the middle of Diagram B. Where along
the efficiency/deterrence relationship this Scenario falls is not a concern of this Article. It is enough to
say that conduct is not as efficient as S3 but more efficient than S1. That said, because only egregious
instances of fraudulent inducement receive punitive damages, it makes sense that the conduct would fall
closer to a regular contract breach.
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The efficiency level of Scenario (3’), and its placement to the left
of S3 but far to the right of S1 in Diagram B, explains the potential
need for heightened deterrence in the form of punitive damages.
These types of damages constitute something more than
compensatory damages (reserved for regular contract breaches), but
still within the confines of civil sanctions, and well below criminal
punishment (reserved for crimes).158 This is consistent with the goals
of the economic model. The economic model seeks to encourage the
formation of contracts but discourage inducements based on fraud.
Criminalizing breaches based on fraudulent inducement may deter
too much. For instance, individuals who act in good faith may still
not want to enter into certain contracts for fear that they might be
criminally prosecuted for fraudulent inducement should they fail to
satisfy their obligation under the agreement. But mere compensation
may not always be enough. It may encourage lying and deceit in
contractual promises. Thus, the economic model explains why
society might impose punitive damages in select egregious instances.
III. THE MORAL-BASED MODEL AND THE ROLE OF CULPABILITY
The moral-based approach takes different forms and, like the
economic model, has a long history.159 This Article focuses on three
representative theories by Jerome Hall, Paul Robinson, and John
Coffee.160
Jerome Hall provides one of the earlier moral-based accounts of
the distinction between criminal and civil liability.161 The crux of
Hall’s argument is that criminal behavior—in contrast to tortious
158. Cf. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions, The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1803–04 (1992) (noting that punitive damages stand somewhere between
compensatory damages and criminal punishment).
159. The moral-based understanding of criminal law traces its roots to Medieval and Greek scholars.
See Hall, supra note 11, at 756–60 (cataloguing the history of the various ways scholars have
distinguished criminal law based on moral principles).
160. See generally Coffee, supra note 10; Hall supra note 11; Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal
Law and Torts: II, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 967 (1943); Robinson, supra note 8.
161. See generally Hall, supra note 11. While Hall’s analysis predates Posner and
Calabresi/Melamed, it can still be seen as a critique of the economic-based approach, which focuses on
deterrence.
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conduct—constitutes immoral or culpable behavior.162 He finds
incomplete the arguments that simply focus on the varying utility of
the sanctions imposed.163 What is missing, according to Hall, is
understanding the reason for the respective sanctions, which requires
focusing on the actual behavior and its moral status.164 This
reasoning readily explains why only crimes receive criminal
punishment.
Hall begins by stating that every tort and crime constitutes a
“harm” and that this harm is made up of two elements: “culpable
conduct” and its “effects.”165 These elements together explain why
torts receive civil sanctions and only crimes receive criminal
punishment. Hall argues that, by and large, crimes, but not torts,
involve culpable conduct.166 For Hall, “moral culpability” means a
“value judgment” formulated in terms of “personal responsibility.”167
Simply put, society finds crimes to be morally wrong.168 Hall relies
on the notion of volitional conduct to explain this distinction.169 A
criminal perpetrator intends to cause harm, a central feature of any
crime.170 A tortfeasor, on the other hand, is merely negligent with no
“intention” of causing harm.171
Next, Hall turns to the second element of a breach, the “effects.”172
This term simply refers to the resulting harm caused by the
perpetrator’s conduct. Effects work differently for crimes and torts.
Actual damages are necessary for the latter but are not essential to the
162. Id. at 775–79.
163. See id. at 760–75. Hall spends a significant portion of his paper discussing the utilitarian model
for explaining criminal punishment (based on deterrence) and its shortcomings. Hall, supra note 160, at
999.
164. Hall, supra note 160, at 999.
165. Hall, supra note 11, at 760.
166. Id. at 775–79.
167. Id. at 775.
168. Hall, supra note 160, at 968.
169. Hall, supra note 11, at 777.
170. With regard to strict liability crimes, Hall ultimately concludes that “moral culpability should
remain the essence of criminal liability,” and these strict liability violations should be re-evaluated. Hall,
supra note 160, at 995–96.
171. Hall, supra note 11, at 778. Hall includes recklessness in his conception of “volitional conduct.”
Id. What matters is that the perpetrator had knowledge that the conduct would cause harm. Id. at 778–
79.
172. Hall, supra note 160, at 967.

594

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

former.173 A tort, in fact, can produce more damage or harm than a
crime.174 This is not problematic under Hall’s model. Regardless of
the quantity of harm, the fact remains that the defendant’s conduct is
not culpable (i.e. not intentional), thus explaining why she would not
receive punishment.175
Hall finds that a crime also produces harm, but calls it “social
harm.”176 Unlike individual damages, a crime’s effect is not
quantifiable, so it cannot be measured in money.177 It represents an
overall harm to society, not an individual slight.178 Hall appeals to
Blackstone’s original public/private dichotomy as a starting point.179
He notes that a tort represents a private injury that is immaterial to
the public.180 Crimes are different. They “strike at the very being of
society” and represent public wrongs.181
Hall spends a significant amount of time explaining the contours
of “social harm,” the bulk of which is not relevant here.182 The
important take-away is that social harm and culpability are both
integral to Hall’s notion of a crime in a way that they are not with a
tort breach.183 This analysis also explains why attempts to commit
crimes receive criminal punishment. Even though they do not create
any individual harm, these acts still represent culpable conduct that is
an affront to society, i.e., the conduct causes social harm.184

173. Id. at 969. Richard Epstein makes a similar point by noting that an “intention to harm” plays a
central role in crimes, whereas actual damages plays a central role in the case of torts. Richard Epstein,
Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION,
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231, 242 (John Hagel & Randy E. Barnett eds., 1977).
174. Hall, supra note 160, at 972.
175. Id. at 974.
176. Id. at 969.
177. Id. at 971.
178. Id.
179. Hall, supra note 11, at 757–58.
180. This notion explains why torts are prosecuted by individuals and not the state. Id
181. This difference explains why crimes are only prosecuted by the state at its discretion. Id.
182. Hall, supra note 160, at 967–79.
183. This combination of “culpability” and “social harm” also explains why intentional torts do not
receive punishment. Id. While this conduct can be considered culpable, unlike crimes, intentional torts
do not cause social harm; they only cause individual harm. Id. at 974–75.
184. Id. at 975.
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Paul Robinson also presents a model based on moral
considerations.185 He does not think that the efficiency based
arguments of scholars like Posner and Shavell adequately explain the
distinction between tort and criminal sanctions.186 Their focus on
optimal deterrence, according to Robinson, does not capture the basic
thrust of the two types of sanctions.187 They try to rationalize a
system that is fundamentally based on emotion, not necessarily
intellect.188 Robinson relies on the intuitive difference between these
two sanctions to make his case. Simply put, criminal liability signals
blameworthiness, whereas civil liability does not.189
According to Robinson, the language used to describe these
sanctions reflects this view.190 In the criminal context, we “speak of a
‘crime’ rather than a ‘violation’ or a ‘breach,’ and of ‘punishment’
rather than of ‘remedy’ or ‘damages.’”191 These criminal-related
terms carry the stamp of moral condemnation, whereas as the civil
terms do not.192 For Robinson, this also explains why “consent
generally is a defense in tort but not a defense to most crimes.”193 A
plaintiff can vitiate their own right to recover damages, but a crime
constitutes a wrong to society.194 So, individual consent cannot
remove criminal liability. This also explains why fines are paid to the
state and not the victim.195

185. Robinson, supra note 8, at 206.
186. Id. at 204–05.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 209–10. Robinson appears to suggest that a cost-benefit analysis could be used but that it
would have to carefully take into account society’s desire for moral condemnation. Id. at 212.
189. Robinson seems to imply that intentional torts, like their negligent counterparts, do not have the
imprimatur of moral condemnation, and thus, only receive civil liability. Id. at 210 n.38. He suggests
that punitive damages are most likely imposed in these cases where the harm caused is actually greater
than that in a typical negligent breach. Id.
190. Id. at 205–06.
191. Robinson, supra note 8, at 206.
192. Id. Robinson cites the dictionary, which defines “criminal” as something “disgraceful” and
“punishment” as retributive suffering. Id.
193. Id. at 207.
194. He distinguishes the case of a plaintiff, who may consent to discharge his right to recover
damages, from the case of a suffering patient, who cannot remove criminal liability by consenting to
allow her spouse to kill her. Id.
195. Id.
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Robinson uses the case of a de minimis violation in the criminal
context to bolster his point.196 A minor violation of criminal statutory
law may avoid criminal liability but is no escape for civil liability.197
Robinson cites to the relevant part of the Model Penal Code, which
states, a “court shall dismiss a prosecution if . . . it finds that the
defendant’s conduct . . . cause[d] or threaten[ed] the harm or evil
sought . . . only to an extent too trivial to merit condemnation or
conviction.”198 Robinson’s point is well taken. We do not punish
every violation of the criminal code. Only those acts that violate
some societal norm deserve punishment.199 However, all tort
breaches can be prosecuted as long as the victim suffers some
damage.200
Robinson then asks why we need two systems at all.201 Would it
not be more efficient to have one system that doles out punishment or
damages, depending on the nature of the breach? In fact, given the
great diversity of society and legal regimes, he thinks one would
expect to see at least some structures that use a single criminal-civil
system.202 The lack of such unified systems is meaningful to
Robinson. He speculates that the human desire to make moral
judgments is universal, and “there is practical value in giving formal
legal expression to this human desire.”203 A distinct criminal system
serves as the best way to express this sentiment. It provides a clear
and simple mechanism for communicating moral condemnation.204
196. Id. at 206.
197. Robinson, supra note 8, at 206.
198. Id. at 206 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12(2) (1985)).
199. Robinson makes clear that not “every norm violation gives rise to criminal liability.” Yet,
“criminal liability cannot exist in the absence of a violation of a norm.” Id.
200. Id. Other scholars have also focused on the notion of deserving punishment. Jules Coleman
argues that a tort simply requires a “state [to have] sufficient grounds for shifting a loss from” one party
to the other. Jules Coleman, Crimes, Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 313, 326 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1985). Criminal punishment, on the other hand,
means loss of liberty, so society must be sure that this person deserves such sanction. This requires “an
inquiry not only into what a person does, but his responsibility and guilt in having done it.” Id.
201. Robinson, supra note 8, at 207–08.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 207.
204. Specifically,
[b]y creating a special criminal label and widely disseminating the notion that this label has a different,
condemnatory meaning, the system enhances its ability to communicate a clear condemnatory message.
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John Coffee also endorses the concept of blameworthiness or
moral condemnation as the distinctive quality of crimes compared to
their tort counterparts.205 He begins with the premise that criminal
sanctions serve a socializing force.206 Their purpose is to morally
educate citizens.207 This purpose is distinct from tort sanctions, which
are merely private sanctions that serve to price behavior. Civil
sanctions “do nothing to reinforce a communitarian ethic or promote
social bonding.”208
Coffee explains that the stark contrast between the purpose of civil
sanctions and criminal punishment turns on the existence or nonexistence of criminal intent.209 He finds that punishment is only
appropriate where the individual knows that their behavior could be
harmful to others.210 Without this mens rea, or state of mind, an
individual does not require moral socialization, so the imposition of
monetary sanctions is sufficient.
Coffee recognizes that certain crimes are premised on strict
liability or negligence.211 He finds that society may be better off by
pricing this misbehavior, much like torts do.212 Coffee, in fact, is
troubled by the expansion of the realm of criminal law: “behavior
that was once considered merely tortious or a regulatory violation is
now prosecuted as a crime.”213 He cites securities fraud and worker
safety remedies as examples.214 Coffee believes that this blurring
between tort and criminal law weakens the overall effectiveness of
criminal law as a social control.215 He advocates for a greater role of
Without a distinct criminal system, it would be more difficult to convey the message that some cases
signal condemnation yet others do not.
Id. at 208.
205. Coffee, supra note 10, at 235.
206. Id. at 223.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 225.
209. He recognizes that criminal behavior operates on a continuum, ranging from “the trivial to the
egregious.” Still, the distinguishing factor between all of these crimes and any tort rests on the notion of
criminal intent. Id. at 239.
210. Id. Coffee cites to case law to illustrate this level of intent. Id.
211. Coffee, supra note 10, at 228.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 238.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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intent to separate those actions that truly deserve criminal
punishment from those that should merely receive monetary
compensation.216
A. Culpability: Crime vs. Tort Breach
The moral-based model relies on the notion of culpability or
blameworthiness to explain the differing treatment of crimes and
torts. The concept of blameworthiness is tied up with intentional
conduct. If a person intends to cause harm, the resulting act merits
condemnation and thus criminal punishment. On the other hand, if
the person was merely careless, these actions do not suggest ill
motive, so they do not have the imprimatur of moral condemnation.
Thus, it makes little sense to criminally punish this conduct, even if it
causes the same or greater harm.
Hall focuses on the intentional nature of criminal behavior and its
resulting culpability.217 Robinson relies on the intuitive moral
condemnation associated with a criminal violation.218 While he does
not explicitly state a criminal violation requires intentional conduct,
this seems to be the inference and would explain why society
associates terms like “violation” or “punishment” with criminal acts
but “damages” or “remedy” with tort breaches. Coffee also relies on
the intentional nature of criminal behavior as the distinctive quality
that explains why such breaches receive criminal punishment.219
The moral-based approach adequately explains the differing
treatment of Scenarios (1) and (2). Scenario (1) is criminally
punished because the perpetrator intended to take the computer.
Scenario (2), however, does not receive such sanctions because the
person was merely careless in destroying the computer, and thus, had
no intention of destroying the property. Diagram C graphically
represents this relationship.

216. Id. at 193. He finds that the best way to implement these changes is at the sentencing stage. Id. at
24–45.
217. Hall, supra note 11, at 775–79.
218. Robinson, supra note 8, at 205–06.
219. Coffee, supra note 10, at 235.
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S1
Deterrence
Moral Culpability

S2
Underlying Efficiency
Diagram C
Diagram C incorporates Diagram A with the addition of a Z-axis,
representing an increasing level of moral culpability. As the level of
“intent” increases, so does the culpability.220 The tort and crime stand
as polar opposites. The tort breach (S2) falls on the lower end of the
continuum, suggesting no culpability, because the perpetrator did not
intend to destroy the computer. The crime (S1) falls on the upper end,
suggesting a high degree of culpability, because the perpetrator
purposefully took the computer.
Extrapolating from this relationship, one could imagine that a
breach based on “recklessness” would represent a level of culpability
somewhere between these two extremes. Here, the perpetrator would
have exhibited a “conscious disregard of, or indifference to, [the] risk
[of harm].”221 We can imagine a defendant who is severely
intoxicated and enters the coffee shop and knocks down the
220. Here, “intent” means the state of mind of the perpetrator in a common law breach. Intent or
purpose is considered the most serious mental state, followed in descending order by knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence. See 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 5.1 (2d ed. 2010); Kenneth Simons, Rethinking
Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. a (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 2 (2010) (focusing on the knowledge of the defendant and finding that recklessness entails that
“the [defendant] knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk
obvious to another in the person’s situation.”).
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computer. This breach is still treated as a tort, but such action may
trigger punitive damages.222 The moral-based theory can explain this
result. Recklessly destroying the computer is morally worse than
negligently destroying it. The reckless actor was aware of what could
happen in a way that the negligent defendant was not. This
heightened awareness suggests a greater culpability.223 Still, the
reckless defendant remains less culpable than the defendant who
intentionally took the computer. Graphically, the former act would
fall somewhere between S1 and S2 on the culpability continuum.
This placement explains why this kind of action would receive
punitive damages, which are greater than compensatory damages but
less than criminal punishment. Under the moral-based model,
punitive damages can be seen as a device for expressing moral
condemnation, just not as strong as the condemnation associated with
criminal punishment.224
Diagram C combines both the economic and moral-based models.
In this way, the crime (S1) stands as the morally blameworthy action
and also the one that is least efficient, requiring the greatest
deterrence. Conversely, the tort breach (S2) triggers no moral
condemnation. Its underlying conduct is also efficient and requires
the least deterrence. Diagram C does not make any causal claims. For
instance, the crime does not receive the highest deterrence because of
its moral blameworthiness or vice versa (this analysis is beyond the
scope of the Article). Still, these correlations make some sense. It
stands to reason that the most culpable conduct would also merit the
most deterrence. On the other hand, conduct with no stamp of moral
culpability would merit the least deterrence.
222. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (2010) (“While a showing of negligence generally
suffices for compensatory damages, the standard for awarding punitive damages commonly refers to the
defendant’s reckless conduct—or reckless indifference to risk, or reckless disregard for risk.”).
223. Hall makes a similar point in the criminal context, when explaining that recklessness may
constitute volitional conduct worthy of moral condemnation. See Hall, supra note 160, at 982.
224. Under the moral-based position, punitive damages can be seen as a device for expressing moral
condemnation, just not as strong as the condemnation associated with criminal punishment. See, e.g.,
Richardson, supra note 8, at 114 (“Punitive damages are a conventional device for expressing
condemnation. However, the relative strength of that condemnation is weak compared to the
condemnation expressed by the criminal sanction. Punitive damages carry neither the possibility of
imprisonment nor the collateral consequences of criminal punishment.”).
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A similar correlation exists with the reckless breach described
earlier. As slightly more culpable than the negligent breach, it stands
to reason that it would also constitute slightly less efficient behavior.
The reckless perpetrator had heightened knowledge that her actions
could destroy the computer. So, imposing punitive damages could be
the appropriate deterrence. This would not chill valuable economic
activity (frequenting coffee shops) because the perpetrator—unlike
his negligent counterpart—was aware of the risks. This larger
monetary sanction would simply deter this individual from getting
drunk when frequenting coffee shops, not from frequenting coffee
shops. Still, because this behavior would not be as inefficient as
intentionally taking the computer, criminal punishment would be
inappropriate and constitute too great a deterrence.
The economic and moral-based scholars seem to recognize the
interplay between the two approaches. Posner, for instance, states
that the moral-based approach may have some “normative merit[],”
but the fact remains that economics provides the superior theory for
understanding criminal punishment.225 Calabresi and Melamed also
seem to suggest that some entitlements can be explained by moral
principles but that efficiency considerations provide the more
persuasive explanation.226 These statements at least suggest that the
two approaches can be viewed together in a consistent matter. The
same recognition holds true for the advocates of the moral-based
model. Hall, for instance, focuses on origins of the punishment but
recognizes that the type of punishment flows from this original
determination of culpability.227 Robinson too suggests that the two
models positively correlate. He simply finds that the economic
approach does not recognize the “fundamental differences in [the]
purposes and goals” of criminal and civil sanctions.228

225. Posner, supra note 8, at 1230–31 (“Although judges and legislators do not often speak the
language of economics, this Article suggests that they often do reason implicitly in economic terms and
that economic analysis is, therefore, helpful in explaining the basic structure of law, including criminal
law.”).
226. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1105.
227. Hall, supra note 160, at 1000.
228. Robinson, supra note 8, at 205.
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B. Integrating the Economic and Moral-Based Models
Some scholars go further and explicitly argue that both approaches
must be used in order to persuasively explain the distinction between
criminal and civil sanctions.229
Alvin Klevorick uses Posner’s and Calabresi/Melamed’s economic
models as starting points.230 However, he finds that these theorists
must first posit a political and moral foundation of society before
engaging in a law and economic analysis of civil and criminal
liability.231 For Klevorick, any discussion of efficient behavior and
market forces presupposes something he coins a “transaction
structure.”232 Society has created this structure, which “sets out the
terms or conditions under which particular transactions or exchanges
are to take place.”233 This structure embodies a particular society’s
values, including a description of its actual moral, political, and legal
commitments.234 He goes on to say that the sanctions we place on
certain acts—e.g., criminal punishment or monetary damages—
reflect efforts to enforce this structure.235 He gives special attention
to the moral aspect of society’s transaction structure, citing Hall’s
emphasis on culpability and moral condemnation.236 Klevorick
concludes that this type of moral judgment informs any subsequent
economic analysis. If we morally condemn an act such as a crime this
will alter how we perform any cost-benefit analysis resulting from
such behavior.237
Similarly, Dau-Schmidt focuses on both economic and moral
principles to explain the existence of criminal sanctions.238 He begins
by positing a model that focuses on shaping the preferences of
individuals when they deviate from established norms.239 This
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8; Klevorick, supra note 8.
Klevorick, supra note 8, at 907–08.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 908.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Klevorick, supra note 8, at 917.
Id. at 918.
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8, at 3.
Id. at 26.
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“preference-shaping theory” serves to promote adherence to these
norms through criminal punishment. It targets individuals whose
“actions indicate that [they] intended or desired to bring about the
proscribed harm.”240 Accordingly, it makes no sense to punish those
individuals that are negligent, because their actions do not indicate
deviant preferences—they did not intend to contravene social
norms.241
What sets Dau-Schmidt’s theory apart from the traditional
economic model is how criminal punishment shapes preferences.
While he notes the straightforward economic value of deterrence,
Dau-Schmidt goes one step further.242 He finds that this punishment
also represents “an expression of society’s condemnation of the
criminal act.”243 This moral dimension is crucial to understanding the
purpose of criminal law.
Revisiting Diagram C, Klevorick and Dau-Schmidt would
probably say that it is no coincidence that the crime places high on
the moral condemnation line and low on the efficiency continuum.
Criminal punishment represents an expression of both these
economic and moral opinions. Similarly, both of these principles
inform society’s decision to impose only civil sanctions for tort
breaches. So, it makes sense that these breaches are low on the moral
condemnation line and high on the efficiency scale.
Again, this Article’s aim is not to argue for any specific causal
relationship. Does the moral condemnation suggest the lower
economic efficiency, and thus, the greater deterrence? Or, is it the
other way around? The point here is that these two approaches can be
seen as part of a single integrated system expressing society’s social
structure and related mores.

240. Id.
241. Dau-Schmidt argues that an “opportunity shaping” model provides the better mechanism for
tortfeasors. Id. at 23. By imposing only monetary sanctions at the discretion of individual members, this
policy simultaneously creates incentives for good behavior and provides a means to compensate victims.
Id. at 22–23.
242. Id. at 36–37.
243. Id. at 37.
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IV. CONTRACT BREACHES AND THE ROLE OF CULPABILITY
Contract breaches are generally not part of the greater discussion
on moral judgments and the criminal/civil divide. Hall briefly
discusses contract making and distinguishes it from torts and
crimes.244 He explains that torts and crimes just forbid certain
actions, whereas contractual duties arise only after certain affirmative
conduct.245 The discussion ends there. He then moves on to
explaining the tort/crime distinction without further reference to
contracts.246
Robinson also makes a brief reference to contracts when
discussing the notion of culpability.247 He argues “[b]reaking a
contract . . . may be conduct that we seek to discourage and may . . .
justify compensation of an injured party, but such conduct does not
necessarily carry the moral blameworthiness . . . implicit in [a]
criminal conviction.”248 Interestingly, he does not elaborate further.
Why do contract breaches not share the moral condemnation of
crimes? A contract breach appears to mimic the contours of a
criminal act. Both are intentional and purposeful behavior that can
cause the same harm.
Many scholars, in fact, have incorporated the notion of moral
obligation into their understanding of contract formation. Immanuel
Kant’s famous categorical imperative appeals to promise-making as a
paradigmatic example of following the moral law.249 Scholars like
Charles Fried have gone on to argue that a contract represents a
moral responsibility to fulfill the terms of the contract.250 Fried
argues that that a contract corresponds to an underlying moral
promise and that contract law serves as society’s enforcement
244. See generally Hall, supra note 11.
245. Id. at 755.
246. Id. at 756–60.
247. Robinson, supra note 8, at 206.
248. Id. at 206.
249. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39–40 (Lewis Beck trans.)
(1959). Kant maintains that if a single person’s act of not fulfilling a promise were made into a universal
law (everyone made promises only to break them) contracting would be impossible. Id.
250. Fried, supra note 14; Kraus, supra note 14, at 1604 (discussing the correspondence account of
contract making).
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mechanism of this promise.251 More recent scholars have argued that
contract law should recognize this underlying moral obligation or
promise.252 This stands in sharp opposition to the economic
scholars—and their notion of efficient breach—who argue that
sometimes breaching a contract is the economically right thing to
do.253 But again, the discussion centers on the internal mechanics of
contract law.254 The purpose of this Article is to explain why contract
breaches receive the same treatment as tort breaches. That said, it
would seem that understanding contracts as moral obligations
bolsters the conclusion that under the moral-based model, a contract
breach—much like a crime—constitutes culpable conduct worthy of
moral blame.
A. The Culpability of a Contract Breach
It is hard to see how the moral-based model can differentiate
between Scenario (3) and Scenario (1) in terms of culpability. In both
cases, the perpetrator intentionally caused the same type of harm,
namely the loss of a computer. Neither was mistaken or careless.
This behavior stands in stark contrast to Scenario (2) where the
perpetrator did not intend to destroy the computer. This suggests that
the contract breach also deserves moral blame, and thus, criminal
punishment.
251. Fried, supra note 14, at 1 (“The promise principle, which in this book I argue is the moral basis
of contract law, is that principle by which persons may impose on themselves obligations where none
existed before.”).
252. See generally Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708
(2007) (discussing the divergence between the legal requirements/consequences of a contract breach and
the moral requirements/consequences of a breaking a promise); DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO
CONTRACT: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 89–115 (2003). But see Michael Pratt,
Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801 (2008) (arguing that contracts do not constitute
promises); see also Kraus, supra note 14, at 1648 n.3 (citing scholars).
253. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1649 n.6 (citing scholars supporting efficient breach principle);
supra Part II.B. and accompanying notes.
254. Shiffrin does suggest (albeit briefly) that the moral nature of the respective breaches explains
why torts and crimes “levy penalties” but contract breaches do not. Shiffrin, supra note 252, at 737.
Contract breaches involve a breach of trust, while torts/crimes involve a breach of physical security. Id.
at 738–39. It is not clear what “penalties” mean here, as only crimes receive criminal punishment.
Moreover, Shiffrin seems to assume that a tort or crime causes a different type of harm than a contract
breach. It is unclear what this means or how this distinction helps here, particularly where the Scenarios
articulated above all cause the same harm.
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The voluntariness of this transaction does not readily seem to alter
this analysis. Recognizing that the perpetrator could have avoided
entering into the contract does not, in any way, mitigate the resulting
breach. If anything, the moral-based model suggests this person is
more culpable because she intentionally broke a promise that she
chose to undertake and could fulfill. On the other side, it is not the
victim’s fault that the contract was breached. It is counterintuitive to
suggest that the victim was somehow responsible for entering into the
contract, and this fact now vitiates the need for criminal punishment.
Indeed, in the criminal context, a victim’s conduct does not generally
play a part in determining whether criminal punishment should be
imposed. In Scenario (1), it may have been unadvisable for the victim
to go to the bathroom, but no one would suggest that this act absolves
the perpetrator of criminal liability.255 Any argument based on
voluntariness needs more explanation (see infra Part V).
Perhaps, the focus should be on the role that intent plays in a crime
as compared to a tort or contract breach. Under the moral-based
model, culpability is central to a crime in a way that it is not with a
tort breach. Hall explains that “the immorality of the actor’s conduct
is essential” to a crime, whereas “moral culpability is of secondary
importance in tort law.”256
Understood in this way, a contract breach would be more akin to a
tort breach. Neither requires intentional conduct. A person is liable if
she fails to take the appropriate duty of care or fails to fulfill her
255. The case of provocation or heat of passion defense bolsters this point. Here, the defendant argues
that the victim somehow provoked the conduct, usually in the context of a homicide. Lizama v. United
States Parole Comm’n, 245 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932
(10th Cir. 1987); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985) (describing manslaughter as “a homicide
which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse”). While this may lessen the defendant’s
punishment, it will not absolve the defendant of all potential criminal liability. Appealing to the notion
of consent also does not provide a persuasive answer. First, it seems counterintuitive to argue that the
victim of a contract breach consented in some way to the resulting breach. She entered the contract
expecting satisfication of the contractual terms. Moreover, in the criminal context, while a person may
consent to activity that may otherwise be unlawful (e.g. fighting in a boxing match), this individual also
absolves the perpetrator of any civil liability. Thus, relying on consent in the contract breach to explain
the lack of criminal punishment would lead to the unintended conclusion that the breacher should also
not be liabile for civil damages.
256. Hall, supra note 160, at 971.
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obligations under a contract. In fact, a contract breach does not
require a reasonable duty of care. The legal standard is strict liability.
With Scenario (3), it is irrelevant that the perpetrator intentionally
breached the contract. The only thing that counts is that she did not
pay the money (i.e. she did not perform under the contract). So, while
this breach constitutes culpable behavior, this fact is of secondary
importance to the actual harm caused.
This argument does not have much persuasive appeal. The fact
remains that both perpetrators in Scenarios (1) and (3) intended to
deprive the victim of the value of the computer. Thus, it seems
somewhat facile to say that the perpetrator in Scenario (3) is not
culpable, or otherwise not deserving of criminal punishment, simply
because intent is not a legal element of a contract breach. Indeed, the
purpose of the moral-based account is to explain the legal regime, not
the other way around. This view means morally judging the actual
conduct, not the formal requirements. The varying legal standards—
strict liability versus intent—seem to follow from the criminal/civil
divide, not explain it. Society legally requires intent with crimes
because this conduct is criminally punished. On the other hand,
because contract breaches only receive civil sanctions, intent is not as
important.
Focusing on intent makes sense when comparing criminal and tort
breaches. In Scenario (2), the negligent tortfeasor cannot
intentionally cause the destruction of the computer. The crux of this
tort is its non-intentional nature. This explains why this individual
cannot be culpable and why society does not impose criminal
punishment. But the perpetrator in Scenario (3) purposefully
withholds the money even though she has the ability to pay.
Regardless of the legal requirements, this person’s behavior would
seem to trigger the same moral judgment as the criminal counterpart,
suggesting the imposition of criminal sanctions.
B. The Culpability of Fraudulent Inducement
Relying on intent to distinguish crimes from contract breaches
becomes more problematic when examining Scenario (3’). Intent is

608

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

equally relevant here as with a crime. Fraudulent inducement legally
requires a defendant to intentionally make a false representation as to
a future act on which the other party relies.257 So, if the criminal act
is morally blameworthy, it is hard to see why the fraudulent
inducement would not also be so.258
Maybe, the emphasis should be on individual damages. Damages
play an important role in a fraudulent inducement claim, much like in
a tort or normal contract breach.259 Hall makes a similar point when
discussing the difference between “social harm” and “individual
damages.”260 With both Scenarios (3) and (3’), if the perpetrator
returned the money, for all practical purposes there would be no
cause of action. This is different from Scenario (1). Even if the
computer were returned to the victim, the defendant would still be
criminally liable and subject to punishment. But, this emphasis on
damages does not explain why only crimes trigger criminal
punishment. In other words, does society criminalize Scenario (1)
because damages are not necessary to make out a criminal act? The
corollary would be that society does not criminalize the other
Scenarios because damages are integral to making out a breach. This
approach does not have significant persuasive appeal. The moralbased theory still needs to explain how the requirement of individual
harm or damages provides the key to understanding the civil/criminal
divide. 261 In fact, it seems the causal relationship works the other
way around. The requirement of damages follows from society’s
decision not to criminalize torts and contracts rather than explaining
it. It is precisely because society finds crimes morally worse than
torts that damages are integral to the latter but not the former. Where
257. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981).
258. Perhaps, this partly explains why some jurisdictions have criminalized this type of fraud. But this
criminalization is certainly not universal a practice, so an explanation is still necessary as to why such
behavior is not criminal in certain jurisdictions where larceny remains a crime.
259. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977); 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:1 (4th
ed. 2010).
260. See supra Part III and accompanying notes.
261. Hall’s distinction between social harm and individual damages is also not particularly helpful.
The moral-based account must still explain why the harm involved in the crime constitutes social harm,
while the harm involved in the tort or contract breach constitutes individual damages. In the three
Scenarios, in fact, the harm appears to be the same, namely the loss of the value of the computer.
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does that leave contract breaches? On the one hand, individual
damages are integral for civil liability, suggesting a similarity with
torts. But this behavior is also intentional and purposeful, much like a
crime.
C. Contract Breaches and the Moral-Based/Economic Models
The moral-based approach has merit. However, a more nuanced
analysis is required. A good start would be to understand how the
economic and moral models work, or do not work, together when
examining contract breaches.

S1

Deterrence

Moral Culpability
S3’
S3, S2
Underlying Efficiency

Diagram D
Diagram D incorporates Diagram B with the addition of the Zaxis, representing the increasing moral culpability of the individual
breach. Again, Scenario (2) falls on the low end of this line because
the breach does not involve intentional conduct, whereas Scenario (1)
falls on the upper end because the breach was intentional. These
locations correlate with the economic principles of efficiency and
deterrence.
Scenarios (3) and (3’) do not fit in the same way. The economic
model places both of these breaches in the lower right quadrant,
indicating relatively efficient behavior that requires low deterrence.
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S3’ falls to the left and above of S3 (indicating less efficient
behavior) but still a significant distance from S1. These locations
imply that both types of contract breaches are relatively low on the
culpability continuum and do not constitute conduct worthy of moral
condemnation.262 Yet, the moral-based approach suggests the
contrary, namely that these breaches are on par with crimes.263
Likewise, they constitute intentional-based conduct that merits equal
blame. But, if these breaches are placed on the upper end of the
culpability continuum with S1, this suggests that these acts have a
low efficiency and require high deterrence. So, it seems that the
moral-based and economic models do not positively correlate when
explaining contract breaches.
The logical conclusion is that one of the models is not accurately
classifying these breaches. The problem rests with the moral-based
approach, at least as it stands. Something more is required to explain
the unique nature of contract breaches. What is missing is
distinguishing the concept of a non-voluntary obligation from a
voluntary obligation.
V. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF CONTRACTS: VOLUNTARY OBLIGATIONS
VS. NON-VOLUNTARY OBLIGATIONS
The underlying responsibility in a contract breach has a profoundly
different structure than the underlying responsibility in a tort or a
crime. The Article distinguishes here between a “voluntary
obligation” and a “non-voluntary obligation.”264 Non-voluntary
262. While the economic model finds that S3’ is less efficient than S3, this model still finds that S3’ is
far more efficient than S1, suggesting that S3’ constitutes conduct that is far less culpable than S1.
263. Because S3’ involves deceit, the moral-based model would probably find that this conduct is
more culpable than S3 or the regular contract breach.
264. These terms and their respective definitions generally track Jody Kraus’ recent distinction
between “moral duty” and “moral obligation.” See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1613–15; see also Michael
Pratt, Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 26 LAW & PHIL. 531, 533 (2007). Kraus’ focus,
however, is on the normative, moral nature of contract breaches. He follows scholars like Fried who are
interested in exploring the underling moral responsibilities of contract formation. Kraus uses this
distinction for the purposes of exploring the notion of personal sovereignty in making promises (none of
which is relevant here). See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1606–09. This Article is not particularly interested
in the debate about the relationship between moral obligations and legal responsibilities. See, e.g.,
Patricia White, Law and Moral Obligation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (1982) (discussing the difference
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obligations are responsibilities that are already in place, and as a
member of society, each person is automatically subject to them.265
They exist independent of any individual action, and thus, are not
self-imposed. A non-voluntary obligation represents the underlying
responsibility in a tort or crime. With a voluntary obligation, on the
other hand, a person chooses to take on this obligation with another
person. Unlike non-voluntary obligations, without taking some
affirmative action with another individual, a person is not subject to
these voluntary obligations.266 A voluntary obligation represents the
underlying responsibility in a contract breach.
A. The Elements of a Contract Breach and Criminal/Tort Breach
The basic elements of a crime and tort point to a non-voluntary
obligation, whereas the elements of a contract breach suggest a
voluntary obligation. A prima facie tort requires a breach of a duty of
care. An individual must fail to exercise a reasonable level of care as
defined by the circumstances.267 This duty is not triggered by any
voluntary action. All members of society are bound by it.268 In this
way, the perpetrator in Scenario (2) was responsible for using the
appropriate level of care when the individual frequented the coffee
shop. This duty did not arise from voluntary action or agreement. By
this person’s very presence in the coffee shop, she had a duty not to
negligently destroy the computer.269
The same notion of non-voluntary obligation is perhaps more
obvious in a crime. Most people think of criminal laws simply as
between natural law scholars, such as Thomas Aquinas, who find a relationship between legal duties and
moral duties and positivist scholars, such as John Austin, who deny any such essential relationship).
This Article’s focus is on the unique nature of the actual legal responsibility arising from contract law
compared with the legal responsibility arising from tort or criminal law.
265. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1614.
266. See id. at 1616.
267. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 3, 7 (2010).
268. A perpetrator may cite to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff to avoid liability, but this is
an affirmative defense where the defendant has technically already breached the level of care. See id. § 3
cmt. b.
269. One might argue that this duty arose voluntarily, in so far as the perpetrator entered the coffee
shop willingly. This is certainly true but misses the point. There is no doubt the nature of the duty will
depend on the circumstances (e.g. driving, entering a coffee shop). Short of the specific environment,
however, the individual has no choice in the matter on whether to take on the duty.
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rules that we all must follow. These duties are automatic; they are not
assumed voluntarily. Take again Scenario (1). The perpetrator had a
legal duty not to take the computer. Like its tort counterpart, this duty
does not arise because this person did or did not do something. The
perpetrator, as a member of society, is simply bound by this duty.
While both breaches signify non-voluntary obligations, this does
not mean that these obligations are made the same. A crime receives
punishment whereas a tort breach receives civil sanctions. This
conclusion is not problematic. There is no reason to think all nonvoluntary obligations must be treated the same. One would not
expect this to be the case. Society can decide that some actions are
worse than others. In fact, this is exactly what the moral-based model
does with torts and crimes. It is worse to intentionally take a
computer, violating a criminal non-voluntary obligation, than to
negligently destroy it, violating a tort non-voluntary obligation. This
explains the differing treatment of these breaches.
A contract breach works differently. Here both parties must agree
to the terms. Simply put, there is no contract if the individuals do not
voluntarily undertake their respective responsibilities with the other
person.270 The underlying obligation is self-imposed. The contract
breacher in Scenario (3) was not automatically obligated to deliver
the money. She chose to buy a computer and to take on the
corresponding voluntary obligation of paying for it. The victim, too,
had to agree to the terms of the contract. For instance, the victim in
Scenario (3) could have refused to sell the computer to the
perpetrator. No contract would have been formed and there would
have been no corresponding voluntary obligation.
Scenario (3’) works the same way. Again, the legal responsibility
of delivering the money is voluntarily undertaken with another
person. A breach, based on fraudulent inducement, requires the
perpetrator to make a representation regarding her end of the deal,
albeit a false representation, and the victim to agree to it. Without
these voluntary actions, there is no legal responsibility or obligation
to fulfill the terms of the contract.
270. See generally supra Part I.A.
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B. The Moral-Based Model: A Redux
With this distinction, this Article revisits the moral-based
approach. As explained earlier, this approach focuses on the
culpability of the act—its intentional nature—to explain why only
crimes receive criminal punishment. The problem, though, is
explaining contract breaches, particularly breaches based on
fraudulent inducement, both of which also appear to involve culpable
conduct.
The voluntary/non-voluntary obligation distinction can help here.
Contract breaches may constitute culpable conduct, but the
underlying responsibility is different from the underlying
responsibility in a tort or a crime. Contractual obligations constitute
voluntary conduct where both parties agree to the terms of the
bargain.271 On the other hand, a non-voluntary obligation to obey a
criminal or tort law is always in place. Society is the source of this
obligation. No individual action is required. The qualitatively
different nature of these two responsibilities explains the varying
treatment of their corresponding legal breaches. 272
Society does not have as great of an interest in policing a voluntary
obligation compared to its non-voluntary obligation counterpart. A
non-voluntary obligation can be viewed as a direct affront to
society’s established precepts. It is a duty owed directly to society,
making any violation particularly significant.273 On the other hand, a
voluntary obligation—because it does not flow from society itself—
does not carry the same importance. It is better understood as a
responsibility directly owed to the individual with whom the
obligation was undertaken. This voluntary/non-voluntary obligation
271. This notion of both parties voluntarily acting to create a voluntary obligation can help explain the
theory behind why a contractual legal responsibility requires more than just a promise by one person.
See, e.g., Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (arguing that
consent of other the party creates the necessary legal obligation).
272. Kraus makes a similar point when explaining why contract breaches do not receive punitive
damages. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1641. He finds that because these contract breaches correlate with
what he calls “moral obligations,” not “moral duties,” it is not surprising that society does not generally
impose punitive damages. Id.
273. This idea does not mean, of course, that society would punish all non-voluntary obligations. As
explained above, society may weigh certain violations (intentional conduct) as morally worse than
others (negligent conduct).
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distinction better captures the public/private distinction discussed
above.274 Because a non-voluntary obligation is owed to society
directly, the resulting tort or crime can be viewed as a public injury.
Because a voluntary obligation is an obligation owed to a person, the
resulting contract breach can be viewed as a private injury.
Put another way, society does not regulate the substance of
voluntary obligations. It is only interested in how these obligations
are created and subsequently breached, not what these obligations
happen to be.275 In this way, contract law involves rules that dictate
the manner by which these responsibilities are created and the
consequences of their breach. Contracts require mutual assent and
consideration. A breach occurs when the obligation is not fulfilled.
None of these rules regulates the substance of the terms of the
contract. These rules do not prescribe or require specific obligations.
For instance, the law does not require that a contract must involve a
reasonable price, a specific time for delivery, or a certain type of
exchange.276 Individuals are generally free to create contracts about
whatever they choose.277 In other words, they bargain or negotiate the
substance of the voluntary obligation that they undertake. In both
Scenarios (3) and (3’), for instance, the perpetrator and victim agreed
upon the terms, which included paying a certain amount for the
computer. The law only regulates the manner by which these
responsibilities become enforceable.278
Non-voluntary obligations, on the other hand, involve substantive
rules that relate to content. In promulgating these rules, society cares
about what behavior is deemed permissible or impermissible. This is
274. See supra Part I.B.
275. This is similar to Hart’s analysis that contract law embodies secondary rules. See H.L.A. Hart,
The Concept of Law, (Oxford 1994), Chapter V. However, Hart discusses these rules for the purpose of
providing a typology of a robust legal system, not explaning the treatment of a resulting breach of these
rules.
276. The requirement that the consideration be more than just a pretense is not inconsistent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981). This requirement is not substantive; it
simply mandates that the two parties actually bargain in good faith for a price. See id.
277. There are some limited exceptions. See id. § 178 (contract not enforceable on grounds of public
policy); id. § 266 (contract not enforceable because of practical impossibility).
278. The legal rules surrounding fraudulent inducement are also non-substantive in that they regulate
how one makes promises (i.e., one cannot misrepresent her intentions), not what the content of the
promises must be. Id. § 167.
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most easily understood in the criminal context, which prohibits
specific conduct. For instance, one cannot hurt someone else or take
someone’s property without permission. Here, society has
determined what the appropriate conduct should be and requires
individuals to follow these mandates. In Scenario (1), for instance,
the perpetrator was under a non-voluntary obligation not to
permanently deprive you of your property without permission. As a
member of society she was not free to disregard this duty. Tort law
also regulates substantive conduct. An individual must use a
particular level of care when performing an activity. Like a criminal
duty, this obligation is imposed on all individuals by their status as
members of society. In Scenario (2), for instance, the perpetrator was
required to use a reasonable level of care instead of voluntarily
choosing the standard she believed most appropriate.279
By design, the rules governing the creation of voluntary
obligations do not regulate the substance of the duty. So, it stands to
reason that society would not have a great interest in criminalizing
any resulting violation of duties arising from these rules. The contract
breacher merely violates a mutually agreed upon duty. An intentional
violation, therefore, represents a private wrong in which an
individual has failed to satisfy her obligation to another individual
rather than an obligation owed directly to society. This stands in
contrast to non-voluntary obligations, which prohibit behavior that
society has determined to be unacceptable. An intentional violation
of such a duty thus stands as a public-wrong where an individual has
violated a duty owed to society. Accordingly, it stands to reason that
society would seek to heavily sanction any violation by imposing
criminal punishment.
This notion does not mean that society has no interest in trying to
regulate voluntary obligations. These acts affect individuals;
naturally, society would have some vested interest. Indeed, as
obligations owed directly to individuals, it makes sense that society
279. This Article is not suggesting that individuals cannot contract around tort or certain criminal
duties. But the fact remains that without such agreements, these obligations are automatically in place
and must be followed.
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creates rules that allow individuals themselves to bring civil
sanctions for breaches of these obligations. Society may even
determine that certain egregious violations of voluntary obligations,
e.g., fraudulent inducement breaches, should receive punitive
damages. Nevertheless, these voluntary obligations do not rise to the
same level of importance as non-voluntary obligations.
To be clear, this Article is not presenting a new account of why
only crimes receive punishment. Culpability remains the operative
principle to explain criminal liability. Even though torts represent
non-voluntary obligations, they do not constitute culpable conduct,
and thus, do not merit criminal punishment. Crimes and contract
breaches, however, are both worthy of condemnation. It is just how
we conceive of this culpability that changes. The individual who
commits a crime violates a non-voluntary obligation, one that was
already in place and was not agreed upon with another. Society, not
mutual agreement, imposed this duty on this individual, which
explains why this breach alone receives criminal punishment. The
contract breach constitutes a different type of responsibility. Because
this person intentionally violated a voluntary obligation that she
chose to undertake with another person, the resulting breach does not
carry criminal punishment.
This voluntary/non-voluntary obligation distinction also explains
why the moral-based and economic positions do not correlate in the
same way when it comes to contract breaches, but they do when it
comes to crimes and torts.280 The Z-axis showing culpability is best
understood as charting the blameworthiness of the various nonvoluntary obligations society imposes on its members, not voluntary
obligations agreed upon by individuals. This interpretation makes
sense, especially when considering the economic and moral-based
approaches as representing an integrated overall societal structure.
Klevorick focuses on society’s “transaction structure,” and DauSchmidt discusses how society shapes individual preferences. Both
emphasize society’s social, moral, and economic values, and how

280. Compare Diagram C, with Diagram D.
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collectively, these factors influence the treatment of common law
breaches.
So, it is not surprising that when it comes to torts and crimes, the
economic and moral-based approaches correlate positively. Both
criminal and tort breaches correspond to underlying non-voluntary
obligations that are part of societal structure in a way that voluntary
obligations are not. This fact allows us to chart their respective
culpability on the same continuum. However, a contract breach—
because it represents a voluntary obligation—would not necessarily
fall on the same continuum. It is a created obligation that does not
exist until after an individual enters into a contract. Therefore, it
cannot be graphically represented on the same line with torts or
crimes.
The unique nature of a contractual responsibility does not have any
impact on how the economic model deals with this breach. The
efficiency/deterrence relationship applies in the same way to contract
breaches as it does to crimes and torts. This is not surprising. The
economic analysis does not seek to evaluate the nature of the
respective responsibilities. By design, this model only focuses on the
behavior itself and to what extent it constitutes efficient conduct. It is
irrelevant then whether the obligation was created by individuals or
already in place. The distinction between a non-voluntary and
voluntary obligation also provides an explanation as to why scholars
have focused only on torts and crimes when discussing the distinction
between civil and criminal liability. As non-voluntary obligations,
they stand as natural comparisons. Contracts are something different.
They represent voluntary transactions where the responsibility was
voluntarily created.
CONCLUSION
One might wonder whether this exercise has any use beyond mere
intellectual curiosity. Here, this Article submits that this analysis
sheds light on how society values contractual responsibilities. The
above conclusions point to a system that finds intentional-based legal
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breaches arising out of voluntary transactions to be economically
valuable or fundamental to society and thus not to warrant criminal
punishment. This system suggests a society that values the ability of
its citizens to freely engage in market transactions—and create
agreed upon obligations—without the threat of criminal punishment.
Society may deem a contract breacher a “bad person” and go so far
as to permit heightened civil sanctions against her. Still, this person’s
intentional unlawful conduct does not put her in the same category as
a criminal. Only with a crime has the person violated a non-voluntary
obligation owed directly to society.
But the discussion cannot end there. With at least one type of
contract breach—namely fraudulent inducement—society seems to
have changed, at least partly, its perspective. For the purposes of this
paper, the reasonable assumption was made that Scenario (3’) would
only receive civil sanctions. However, a growing number of
jurisdictions now criminalize this type of fraudulent behavior.281 For
instance, federal wire and mail fraud statutes criminalize the taking
of property by fraudulent promises.282 This seems to suggest a
change in how society, or at least some jurisdictions, views these
types of contractual breaches and accordingly a change in how to
apply the economic and moral-based models. What does this change
mean for the economic and moral-based models? How exactly did
the efficiency calculus change when comparing the common law
regime—where fraudulent promises were not criminally punished—
with the current federal statutory scheme? Is the shift better explained
through society’s change in mores and culture, corresponding to a
shift in how society values certain voluntary obligations? These
questions remain to be answered. For now, it is enough to say that
employing the economic and moral-based models can help one
understand how society views or values contract responsibilities.

281. See supra note 50.
282. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006).

